

Documento de Trabajo
N° 18

**“Public diplomacy as a method to improve the insertion of
Taiwan in Latin America and attain a greater rapprochement
to Chile”**

Natalia Lizama

Diciembre de 2011
Facultad de Gobierno

Public diplomacy as a method to improve the insertion of Taiwan in Latin America and attain a greater rapprochement to Chile*

ABSTRACT

Since the foundation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, this state has fought a battle with the Republic of China -Taiwan- for the Taiwanese international diplomatic recognition. In spite of all the efforts, as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Taiwan has declared, China's long-term suppression remains the crux of Taiwan's diplomatic problems.

As a consequence, at present only 23 states maintains formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan and no one of them is an influential actor in the international community, 12 of which are placed in Latin America. With regard to the situation described above, it can be formulated the following questions that guide this research: How could the insertion of Taiwan in Latin America be improved in the Latin American political-strategic context?

And how would it be possible to achieve a greater rapprochement between Taiwan and Chile considering the obstacles imposed by a third country? In order to answer these questions, this research will point at determining the most suitable strategy to improve the insertion of Taiwan in Latin America and achieve a greater rapprochement between Taiwan and Chile in the current Latin American political and strategic context. The strategy to be proposed is public diplomacy as the most suitable method to improve ties between states that cannot establish formal diplomatic relations, such as Chile and Taiwan, and between many Latin American countries with Taiwan. In the specific case of relations Taiwan-Chile, the aim of this strategy is to achieve that Chilean civil society perceive the need of counting on closer relations with Taiwan so as to implement projects, business, cooperation, and so forth, with Taiwan. This could be a mechanism for Chilean government to become aware of the need of creating state arrangements that encourage a rapprochement at least at people to people level.

* Artículo elaborado con el financiamiento entregado por la Biblioteca Central Nacional de Taiwán, dentro del Programa Financiamiento para la Investigación del Centro de Estudios Chinos (Center for Chinese Studies, CCS), durante el primer semestre del año 2010.

INTRODUCTION

Since the foundation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, this state has been fighting a battle with the Republic of China -Taiwan- for the international diplomatic recognition of the latter. After two decades of predominance of Taipei, China succeeded in inverting the situation, because of which Taiwan has lost progressively the diplomatic recognition from its main allies during the last 40 years. At present, only 23 states maintains formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan but no one of them is an influential actor in the international community.

Among the 23 states that maintain formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan, 12 are Latin American countries, which turns this region into the epicentre of the diplomatic competence between Beijing and Taipei.

The PRC has developed a systematic long-term strategy to engage with Latin American countries. Thanks to this, on balance, the citizens of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico have a positive view of China's influence in the world—Chileans and Brazilians by clear majorities. China has left its mark on public opinion in the four most important Latin American countries. In Chile and Brazil, the public opinion sent clear and positive views about relations with China.

Taiwan, in turn, has attempted to boost its informal diplomacy among Beijing's allies in the region. Its main instrument has been the ten representative offices placed in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. Besides, Taipei maintains a mission of the International Economic Cooperation Development Fund (IECDF) in Ecuador.

As the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Taiwan has declared, China's long-term suppression remains the crux of Taiwan's diplomatic problems. For all attempts and purposes, the PRC does not exercise any actual control over Taiwan, nor, of course, does Taiwan have any control over the PRC; nevertheless, the "one-China policy" implemented by the PRC has hindered the establishment of formal diplomatic relations of Taiwan with other states.

In Latin America, Chile was the first South American country to recognize the People's Republic of China in 1970. Chile is also second only to Cuba in its unbroken support for a "one China policy", which means that Chile, as many other states, is unable to maintain formal diplomatic links with Taiwan, and, instead of that, relies on semi-formal and informal channels to maintain its contacts. In the place of diplomatic ties, Chile and Taiwan have established formal institutions -such as the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in Chile- to cover routine issues, but substantive topics are often dealt with through informal networks.

Chile behaves mainly as a "trading nation," that is, harnessing its foreign policy and associated resources to foster economic growth, knowing that it has no worldwide heavyweight ambitions (like Brazil) or ideologically contestatory objectives (like Venezuela and Cuba). Chile is not keen on balancing U.S. power and, in that regard, differs from Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, and Cuba.

Chile, a country with which China has "cooperative partner relations", was the first country that signed a bilateral free-trade agreement with China in 2005. Sino-Chilean relations have broad support in Chile, ranging from the armed forces and the business community to the

civilian parties in the government and the opposition, and have endured and prospered through different presidencies. There is no anti-China backlash in Chile's mass media. Chilean public opinion welcomes China's influence in the world and its growing economic power. Chile's policy toward China is also the policy of the Chilean state, not just of one particular administration.

Unfortunately, China is likely to keep succeeding at weaning Latin American and Caribbean countries away from Taiwan. The People's Republic of China invests impressive resources to induce the remaining Latin American and Caribbean countries that recognize the Republic of China (Taiwan) to switch allegiances. For this reason, it is imperative for Taiwan to implement a strategy to strengthen its ties with Latin American countries and forge a closer relation with Chile.

With regard to the situation described above, it can be formulated the following questions that guide this research: How could the insertion of Taiwan in Latin America be improved in the Latin American political-strategic context?, how would it be possible to achieve a greater rapprochement between Taiwan and Chile considering the obstacles imposed by a third country?, and finally how can it be possible to apply the methods of public diplomacy to the relation between Taiwan and Chile in order to attain a greater rapprochement between both states?

Hence, the general objective of this research is to determine the most suitable strategy to improve the insertion of Taiwan in Latin America and achieve a greater rapprochement between Taiwan and Chile in the current Latin American political and strategic context.

The most appropriate strategy to attain these objectives that will be proposed is Public Diplomacy. As it will be argued in this research, public diplomacy seems to be the most suitable strategy to improve ties between states that cannot establish formal diplomatic relations, such as Chile and Taiwan, and between many Latin American countries and Taiwan.

As being an instrument at the service of foreign policy interest, public diplomacy seeks "to have influence on the behaviour of a foreign government in an indirect way, exercising influence on citizens' attitudes" (Noya, 2007). In the case of relations between Taiwan and Chile, the aim of this strategy is to achieve that Chilean civil society perceives the need of counting on the suitable state institutions in its country so as to implement projects, business, cooperation, etc, with Taiwan. This could be a mechanism for Chilean government to become aware of the need of creating state arrangements that encourage a rapprochement at least at people to people level.

Definitely, this research will contribute to the aim of Taiwan's foreign policy to foster the cordial relations that have been established with its 12 diplomatic allies in Latin America, and attain a greater rapprochement with Chile. In the same way, the strategy formulated here seeks to respond to the need of formulating innovative diplomatic policies in order to turn trends to the Taiwan's advantage, minimize the China's threat, and protect Taiwanese national interests. Moreover, the method of public diplomacy would permit Taiwan government to achieve its main goals, that is, to consolidate diplomatic ties, strengthen substantial relations with non-allies and foster Soft-power Diplomacy, among others.

From the academic point of view, this research will contribute to (1) the lack of literature about public diplomacy in the world; (2) the study of public diplomacy performed by small

and medium-sized states that has hardly been explored so far; (3) the lack of a study of the relations between Taiwan and Chile; and (4) the absence of research in which public diplomacy could be applied to an empirical case, such as the relations between Taiwan with Latin America and Chile.

But chiefly, from the academic perspective, this research has the characteristic of exploring a theme –the relations between two countries that are not able to have formal diplomatic relations- from a relatively new approach of International Relations discipline which is public diplomacy.

In consideration of the fact that this research is framed into the field of social sciences, qualitative data will be used as well as quantitative data, and the strategic methodology to obtain and compile the information is the information analysis.

I. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

1.1 Soft power: the basis of public diplomacy

As a result of the media explosion and the information revolution that have swept the globe in the 1990s, we are inserted in a complex information-intensive global environment in which domestic issues are debated by foreign audiences. Likewise, as a consequence of globalization, since that decade many countries started implementing plans of international positioning and communication in order to compete with other nations in global markets and thus to win tourists, investors or consumers.

In this context, foreign policy has undergone a democratizing process in which now other actors belonging to the civil society have been incorporated in foreign policy and international debates. The directly participation of these groups – like NGOs, citizen activists, private enterprises, scholars, among many others- entails a change “from the modern world of geopolitics and power towards a postmodern world of images and influence. Power in such an environment no longer stems solely from persuasion or coercion, but increasingly from information sharing and attraction, which are essential for the development of soft power. Promotion of the latter is the essential purpose of public diplomacy” (Bátora, 2005, 1).

The concept of soft power was first popularized by Joseph Nye who, in his analysis of the American foreign policy, highlighted the relevance of sources of power other than those concerning the military means. In accordance with his point of view, soft power is the ability of a state to reach “the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries want to follow it, admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness” (Nye, 2002-2003, 552). In contrast with the more popular concept of hard power, which refers to the means of obtaining what a state wants by an active control and the ability to force other state to do what the former wants, i.e., coercion, soft power implies to accomplish one’s objectives by peaceful means, like the attraction. For that reason, soft power is based on ideology, images, culture, symbols, values, credibility, prestige and persuasion, resources that can be employed by the society as a whole, whereas hard power relies on military and economic means used by governments’ institutions. (Noya, 2007). In these words, we can see the main mechanism of soft power, that is: co-optation. In accordance with Nye, soft power is the “ability of a country to structure a situation so that other countries develop preferences or define their interests in ways consistent with its own” (Nye, 2004, 168).

In the heart of the concept of soft power is the transference of ideas and the ability to set

the political agenda in a way that shapes the preference of other states. Here we can see the most important distinction between *realpolitik* and what it is recently called the *noopolitik*. If *realpolitik* focuses on the balance of hard power -the most valuable and material feature of power-, missing the power of transnational ideas, the *noopolitik* underlines the role of international soft power in the expression of ideas, values and rules, and lies on the diffusion of information and knowledge, which is developed into the noosphere.

The noosphere refers to the information and an array of ideas, attitudes and beliefs, producing a feedback effect whose product is the knowledge that will have influence on decision making processes and determine the probabilities of a state, organization or enterprise's success (Molina Rabadán & Igelsias Onofrio, 2006). At present, we are witnesses of, on one hand, the increase of multinational enterprises; a growing economic interdependence, the growth of capital, labour and technology flows, and multilateral institutions; and, on the other hand, the emergence of the global civil society and a wide network of non-governmental organizations that can spread rapidly new values and ideas. This new international context is leading us to change from the paradigm of *realpolitik* to *noopolitik* in the International Relations discipline, now that we are in a transition to a global society based on knowledge, which is the *noopolitik*, the most decisive source of power and strategy (Noya, 2007).

In sum, Nye argues that soft power rests chiefly on three types of resources: the legitimacy and moral authority of foreign policy; the culture and political values, insofar as they are universal and able to seduce other persons; and the culture in a wide sense, inasmuch as it is attractive for other people.[†] And the actors most suited to transmit those ideas, values and knowledge by means of a soft power strategy are non-state actors, such as the organized civil society and its social networks.

Here we have the most visible difference of traditional diplomacy and public diplomacy: the latter needs the participation of multiple actors and organizations which impact on foreign audience, that is, a broader group of actors from different fields and interests that go beyond the activities of a government. States must become attractive to these non-state actors at home and abroad, and also become an important source of soft power by means of harnessing “the potential of the positive images and values associated with domestic non-state actors” (Bátora, 2005, 3). Therefore, what a government has to do is to “find issue-areas of common concern, shared values and common images that would enable cooperation and mutual support between governmental activities and activities of societal actors, which would provide mutual benefits in terms of soft power” (Bátora, 2005, 3), and this by means of network relationships between, on one hand, the state and its domestic non-state actors, and, on the other, between its domestic non-state actors and foreign non-state actors.

1.2 Public diplomacy as a fundamental mechanism for small and medium-sized countries

According to what we have said above, it can be suggested that public diplomacy comprises all activities by state and non-state actors that contribute to the maintenance and promotion of a country's soft power. “Any conduct of public diplomacy –the promotion of soft power of a state– therefore necessarily involves interaction of governments with multiple stakeholders at home. Such an interaction benefits not only the state (or the

[†] For this type of resources of soft power established by Joseph Nye, see Noya. *Diplomacia Pública para el Siglo XXI*, 134.

foreign ministry) but also the non-state actors, because values, images and other assets associated with a state might have an enabling effect on the activities of these actors” (Leonard, Stead, & Smewing, 2002, 9). Thus, the state requires that its ideas and values represent to the domestic actors who will then relate their activities in the international field with their state, promoting its soft power (Bátora, 2005). Consequently, for small and medium-sized states, such as Taiwan, public diplomacy represents an opportunity to gain influence and shape international agenda in ways that go beyond their limited hard power resources (related to size, military and economic strength).

Nevertheless, this research will adopt a different reading of public diplomacy so as it can be suited to the situation between Taiwan and Latin America and Chile. Up to now, public diplomacy approach has been used to refer the sophisticated advertising promoted by governments to influence on the domestic and foreign public opinion. According to the traditional concept, public diplomacy is the sum of all foreign communication activities pointed at elites and opinion leaders, as well as at general public opinion, in order to influence on the image and perception about the state in a positive way.

For analysing relations between Taiwan and non-allies states, we will pay attention to the fact that public diplomacy guarantees the continuity of ties and channels of communication among countries even when formal diplomatic relations could have been deteriorated or broken. Informal networks, that are the basis of public diplomacy, used to be activated precisely in times of crisis of bilateral relations. Public diplomacy is useful when traditional diplomacy cannot be used.

For these reasons, in this research, it will be argued that public diplomacy is the most suitable approach to understand and improve the relations between Taiwan and Latin America and Chile as public diplomacy seeks to “influence on the behaviour of a foreign government in a indirect way, exerting influence on citizens’ attitudes” (Noya, 200, 93).

As the literature states, there are three types of diplomatic and contacts relations: (1) Government-to-government, which is the traditional diplomacy, that is, the formal interchange of communications between states; (2) Diplomatic-to-diplomatic, or personal diplomacy that analyses and regulates interactions among people; (3) and then two types of public diplomacy: (a) People-to-people, such as cultural and educative interchanges, and (b) Government-to-people, that is, public diplomacy strictly speaking (Noya, 2007).

We will define “public diplomacy” as the means by which governments, private groups and individuals influence the attitudes and opinions of other governments, non-governmental entities and peoples in such a way that it can be possible exercise influence on citizens’ attitudes and from then on their foreign policy decisions. By “non-governmental entities” we mean political parties, corporations, trade associations, labour unions, educational institutions, NGOs, religious organizations and ethnic groups (Noya, 2007).

Public diplomacy also acts in accordance with a temporal horizon: short, medium and long. In the short run, public diplomacy is focused on the news management in front of day to day events in a way that the long run objectives can be strengthened. In the medium run, the strategic communication attempts to influence actively on the informative agenda so as to increase the visibility. And in the long run, public diplomacy is focused on the building of relations, creating and feeding social and cultural relations between the country and other countries of its interest from the strategic point of view (Noya, 2007).

The stage that will be considered in this research is the third one. The building of relations of this third long-term stage of public diplomacy should be developed by an agency or institutions far from the political centre in order to increase trust. It requires the participation of professionals with expertise in civil society, from different sectors: business, NGOs, political parties, labour unions, and so forth (Noya, 2007).

In addition to the relevant elements of public diplomacy, we will consider the assumptions of new public diplomacy. This new reading of public diplomacy is based on cultural diplomacy, and the creation of relations of mutual trust and reciprocity. The current environment creates tension on the assumptions of public diplomacy's traditional approach, which requires strategies based on a networks approach, in the micro sense, and social capital, such as associations or guides of permanent social interaction that can be managed by means of an embassy or cultural institute (Noya, 2007).

The objective of new public diplomacy is to foster the dialogue and attain confidence through social networks of lasting human relationships. In order to achieve this goal, new public diplomacy should trust on civil society, such as NGOs, universities, emigrants' communities or diasporas, political parties and even on enterprises (Noya, 2007).

As we have argued, this theoretical framework is the most suitable to the relations of Taiwan and its non-allies, since it would allow Taiwanese decisions makers to elaborate a strategy that points at improving the relations between Taiwan and Latin America and Chile on the basis of the establishment of social networks through civil societies, preventing from deteriorating the Taiwanese links with the PRC.

II. RAPPROCHEMENT STRATEGY OF TAIWAN IN LATIN AMERICA DURING THE LAST DECADES

2.1 Evolution of Taiwan-Latin America relations since 1949

Since the PRC's foundation in 1949, the relationships between the Republic of China – Taiwan- with Latin America have been burnt in by the political dispute with mainland China, because of the Taiwanese fight for the diplomatic recognition by the international community, as well as because of the Taiwanese economic development dependence on foreign markets, exports, technological sources, raw materials, natural resources and hydrocarbons.

Taiwan and Latin America maintain much differentiated economic and political relations. During the last three decades, Taiwan has lost progressively the diplomatic recognition of its main allies in the region. At present, it counts on the formal recognition of only 23 states all over the world with which Taiwan maintain official diplomatic relations but none of them are influential actors in the international system or relevant international organizations. Among them, 12 Latin American and Caribbean states are political allies of the Republic of China (see figure 1), which represents practically the 50 per cent of all, because of which this region is the epicentre of the diplomatic competence between Taiwan and China. With these 12 countries the island maintains intense political and social relationships, but the rest of the Latin American countries maintain only offices of economic and cultural representation of Taipei in the best-case scenario.

Figure 1: Taipei formal diplomatic relations with Latin American countries

Country	Date of diplomatic relations establishment
Belize	1989
El Salvador	1954
Guatemala	1933
Haiti	1956
Honduras	1944
Nicaragua	1990
Panama	1922
Paraguay	1957
Dominican Republic	1940
Saint Kitts and Nevis	1083
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	1981
Saint Lucia	2007

Source: Rodríguez (2008).

The Latin American region has always been an abutment for Taiwan in its dispute with mainland China. During the Cold War, Taipei government used the anti-communism as a vehicle to foster its foreign relations in the shadow of American government, thanks to which it was permanent member of the Security Council of United Nations (Pérez, 2004). In the sixties, the island established formal ties with more than 20 states; its spectacular economic growth let it to send agricultural, fishing and technical missions to developing nations, including its Latin American allies; and it signed two treaties of friendship with Colombia and Uruguay in 1964, another similar with Haiti in 1966, and a commercial treaty with Panama in 1964 (Pérez, 2004). However, the retreat of Taipei from the United Nations triggered the breakup of relationships with Chile, Peru, Mexico, Ecuador, Argentina, Jamaica, Venezuela and Brazil between 1971 and 1974, and in 1979 Taipei maintained formal diplomatic relations with only 21 countries, 12 of them were Latin Americans, which implied that it lost a big share of the political support in the region, that represents the most significance markets for Taipei (Pérez, 2004).

In the decade of 1980, Taiwan launched a diplomatic offensive in order to stop the advance of mainland China in the region, and achieved to establish formal relations with Saint Vincent and the Grenadines in 1981, Dominica in 1983, Saint Kitts and Nevis in 1983, Saint Lucia in 1984, Bahamas and Granada in 1989, Uruguay in 1988, and Nicaragua in 1990, but lost its ties with Colombia and Bolivia (Pérez, 2004). The economic boom experienced by Taiwan during this period and also the international reaction against the Chinese repression of Tiananmen movement -which let Taipei improve its political profile- drove the most important Latin American allies -such as Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile and Mexico- to open offices of commercial representation in Taipei between 1989 and 1992 (Rodríguez, 2008).

When the ex Taiwanese president, Lee Teng-hui, democratized the political system at the end of the eighties, his government adopted a pragmatic and proactive foreign diplomacy consisting in not to insist on the fact that Taiwan was the only one legitimate representative

of all China (Pérez, 2004). This new orientation of the Taiwanese foreign policy encouraged Taipei to request the re-entry into United Nations in April of 1993 and also made Taipei to give more importance to the Latin American relations (Rodríguez, 2008). The chief aim of this pragmatic foreign policy has been to maintain the sovereignty and dignity of Taiwan, guarantee its development and security, and mainland China is the biggest obstacle to achieve this propose in spite of Taipei does not want to enter into a zero-sum competence, rather it is willing to improve the dialogue with the PRC.

During this period, an intense diplomatic activity of Taiwan in Latin America started. In effect, in 1991, Taipei began to participate in the Summits of Central American countries, implying a significant recognition to its status and gives it the opportunity to interact with representatives of relevant Latin American states with which Taipei does not have formal diplomatic relationships, like Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia (Rodríguez, 2008). For instance, in 1997, Taipei signed a strategic alliance in the First Meeting of Heads of State and Government of the Central American Isthmus, celebrated in El Salvador, intensifying its participation in the Central American integration system. These meeting are celebrated every two years.

The pragmatic and proactive foreign policy in the Latin American region has been based on a personalist diplomacy consisting on developing a plenty of tours and visits of Taiwanese authorities to Latin American governments. The personalism is a typical feature of the Chinese diplomacy and, insofar Taiwan has been losing diplomatic support, the high level bilateral visits have been augmented between Taiwan and its allies. Taiwan carried out recently a tour called “Plan for the stabilization of allies”, which includes activities in many Latin American countries. These visits also include army officers which participate very often in the delegations that visit Taiwan (Rodríguez, 2008).

Furthermore, Taiwan has tried to get involved in regional institutions of integration to use them as a lever to augment its political allies but also has created new organisms or fora. Since 1990, it began to promote an alliance with its allies in regional groups to keep them unified in front of Beijing’s pressure. That is why, Taipei created a block in Central America and another in the East Caribbean (Rodríguez, 2008). As we can see in the figure 2, Taiwan is member of the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABE); it is observer of the Central American Integration System, of the Central American Parliament and of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB); it celebrates summits Taiwan-Central America every two years, and annual meetings of foreign affairs ministers of Taiwan and Central America, Taiwan and the Caribbean and Taiwan and Paraguay, dealing with economic cooperation issues (Pérez, 2004).

Figure 2: Presence of Taiwan in Latin American institutions and bilateral fora

Foundation of the Joint Conference Republic of China-Central American Isthmus	1992
Entry to the Central American Bank for Economic Integration	1992
Foundation of the Conference of Economic Cooperation Republic of China- East Caribbean	1997
Foundation of the Summit Taiwan-Central America	1997
Observer of the Latin American Association of Finance Institutions of Development	1998
Observer of the Central American Parliament	1999
Observer of the Central American Integration System	2000

Source: Rodríguez (2008).

The more importance given by the new pragmatic foreign policy to Latin American region was translated into a bigger investment in resources and the creation of new mechanisms to channel the aid as those indicated above, which is also consequence of the economic boom of China and its successful penetration in the region. In 1988, Taiwan founded the Fund for Economic Cooperation and Development of Overseas and re-named in 1991 as the International Cooperation and Development Fund (ICDF), a more comprehensive structure overseeing Taiwan's international economic assistance activities (Rodríguez, 2008). Naturally, this aid to development has a clear political motivation, since this aid is made concrete when a country recognizes Taiwan as a state or during the high level visit between Taipei and its political allies, delivering several loans and donations. And obviously, Latin America has been benefited by the Taiwanese aid; in fact, since the creation of the ICDF, this region has become second of most priority for the distribution of its foreign aid, after Asia (Rodríguez, 2008). This fund includes programs of investments, loans, technical cooperation, development of human resources and humanitarian aid, with the purpose of reduce the poverty and encourage the economic activity, especially in the private sector (Pérez, 2004).

In Latin America, the missions of the ICDF has developed several types of projects covering a wide range of crucial areas for the regional development concerning the investments, loans and technical assistance, among which we can mention: building of highways and roads, housing, agriculture, tourism, assessorships to small and medium-sized enterprises, public management, technological transference, state modernization, industrial technological cooperation, aquaculture, fishing, e-learning, professional training, promotion of investment, marketing for exports, and many others (Rodríguez, 2008). Besides, Taiwan has sent valuable humanitarian aid to Latin American countries affected by earthquakes and hurricanes. That is the way that Taiwanese ties with its Latin American allies have undergone a rapid process of institutionalization, in which the channels and mechanisms of contacts have been multiplied, despite the withdrawals and the breakup with some countries.

The intensification of the Taiwanese aid to Latin America and the Caribbean is also a reaction to the economic and political boom of mainland China in the international system. For that reason, the increasing commercial weight and the strong activism of China in international institutions and fora is forcing Taipei to foster its international aid projects. On the other hand, it is argued that if China maintains its actual economic and political rise in the international arena, fewer and fewer countries will want to establish or maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Nevertheless, it does not mean that Taiwan will lose all its allies; rather, we have to consider that for smaller and poor countries the Taiwanese aid to development and investment is much more relevant than the commercial opportunities or business that mainland China can offers to them. These countries cannot take advantage of the increasing leadership and strategic value of Beijing, and neither can they see it as a huge market, because they do not have either the capital to invest or the products to export. Consequently, Taiwan has more probabilities to maintain or even increase its diplomatic links with small and poor countries.

For this purpose, Taiwan has also used the informal diplomacy to establish semi-official ties with Beijing allies in the region, by means of establishing offices of representation in ten countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela, besides the mission of the ICDF in Ecuador. Likewise, Taiwan has been able to establish inter-parliamentarian relationships much easily thanks to the

democratic character of its political system, instead of resorting to the diplomacy of parties as China (Rodríguez, 2008). Furthermore, Taiwan has achieved that 20 Taiwanese non-governmental organizations cooperate with Latin American region; even though Taiwan has not established (neither China) deep links with Central American or Caribbean civil society; hence Taiwanese relations with its Latin American allies are still depending on the attitude of a small governing elite, increasing the probability that every change of government in the region to imply a change of the orientation toward Taiwan or China (Rodríguez, 2008). These social and political spaces where Taipei is absent are tried to be occupied through a flexible diplomacy by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

2.2 The flexible diplomacy of Taiwan in Latin America and its policy of aid for development

The diplomatic strategy adopted by the Republic of China (R.O.C) depends directly and mainly on the increasing power obtained recently by mainland China in the international realm, and the many global issues that require multilateral coordination to obtain effective solutions. On one hand, in recent years, Beijing has enjoyed a rapid economic growth, allowing it to enhance its political and military power significantly and become an emerging middle power, placing itself in the same group where we find India and other traditional middle powers, like Scandinavian countries, among many others. In order to assume the role a “responsible stakeholder” in the international realm, mainland China is likely to integrate itself into the free market, start a process of democratization of its political system, respect international norms and maintain the status quo in the Taiwan Strait (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China, 2008). On the other hand, global warming, counter-terrorism, drug prevention, finance industry liberalization, foreign labour, humanitarian aid, immigration, disease prevention, trade and fisheries, all require the active participation of Taiwan in multilateral organisms to achieve effective solutions at the global level; for that reason, Taipei government needs to enter and expand its role international organizations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China, 2008).

In order to meet the above challenges, minimize China’s threat and protect national interests, Taiwanese government “is promoting flexible diplomacy through the adoption of diplomatic policies that uphold the principles of dignity, autonomy, pragmatism and agility” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China, 2008). By doing so, Taiwan could increase its bargaining power in the international sphere and face the China’s long-term suppression on higher ground. From the point of view of the Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou, the “flexible diplomacy would serve in the best interest of and provide a win-win solution for Taiwan, mainland China and the other members of the international community”, by means of which Taiwan could normalize its diplomatic endeavours and revitalize relations with its non-diplomatic allies (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China, 2008)

As the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Taiwan (MOFA) has stated in its foreign policy reports, the flexible diplomacy is based on two elements: proactive diplomacy and diplomatic truce. As we have mentioned previously, the proactive strategy implemented by Taipei since the decade of 1990 has the aim of strengthening relations with its diplomatic allies, improving the approach to non-allies, upgrading the level of contact with major countries in each region and expanding its participation in functional and specialized international organizations, among others objectives. The second basis of the flexible diplomacy is the diplomatic truce, which points at bringing “to an end the counterproductive competition between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait so that they can

pursue co-existence and co-prosperity in the international arena” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China, 2008).

The foreign policy strategy of the MOFA relies also on soft power diplomacy, a kind of informal diplomacy that makes up for the inadequacies of formal one that can increase Taiwanese connections in the international community and enhance its image and prestige. Soft power diplomacy includes the integration of the civil society into the activities of the state in the international field. Hence, the government gives support to “domestic NGOs with their international humanitarian aid efforts, assists with the development of ecotourism in our diplomatic allies, encourages certain NGOs to hold international conferences in Taiwan, and works with the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy to present the Asia Democracy and Human Rights Award” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China, 2008). A way of wielding soft power in the international system is by improving the foreign aid, a goal that Taiwan has pursued since many years. Through this policy, Taiwan assists with the elimination of poverty in other developing countries and improves their economies; however, these achievements have not received the attention they deserve because of the fierce diplomatic rivalry across the Strait.

The government’s new flexible diplomacy policy has led to changes in the way Taiwan offers assistance to foreign countries by means of promoting partnerships for progress with Taiwan’s diplomatic allies and friendly countries so as to advance their sustainable development, which can let it to consolidate its bilateral relations even further. With this in view, Taipei has adopted the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness as a guideline for establishing results-oriented cooperation models that meet professional standards so that Taiwan’s foreign aid may fully conform to international practices and expectations. In this sense, the general goals pursued by Taiwanese government are: to promote friendly relations with diplomatic allies; fulfil Taiwan’s responsibility as a member of the international community; safeguard human security; give back to the international community; and develop humanitarianism.

Figure 3: Summary of objectives of Taiwan’s foreign aid policy

<p>Promoting friendly relations with diplomatic allies</p>	<p>Through specialized and effective bilateral aid programs, Taiwan seeks to continue to draw on its own development experience and the resources at its disposal to help its diplomatic allies develop their economic infrastructure and to further boost its diplomatic ties, creating a win-win scenario.</p>
<p>Fulfilling Taiwan’s responsibility as a member of the international community</p>	<p>Having in mind the Article 1 of the UN Charter adopted in 1945 -that addresses the achievement of international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, the promotion of respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms- as well as the fact that Taiwan is becoming the 20th largest economy in the world, it has greater responsibilities to fulfil in the international community.</p>
<p>Safeguarding human security</p>	<p>As a member of the global village and one of the world’s biggest economies, Taiwan has committed to helping less fortunate countries cope with food shortages, combat contagious disease, develop their economies and consolidate environmental protection. By assisting these countries in removing the shackles of hunger, disease and poverty, Taiwan’s aid programs will go a long way toward ensuring human survival and sustainable environmental development around</p>

	the globe.
Giving back to the international community	During all its independent history, Taiwan received considerable donations, loans and other forms of assistance from international organizations and wealthy nations, so its development history is due to this valuable international aid. Taiwan society feels obliged to share its development experience and give back to the international community.
Developing humanitarianism	Taiwan has developed Official Development Assistance (ODA) programs intended to offer relief to needy or disaster afflicted countries in the form of technical or financial aid, or the provision of food and other supplies. Taiwan government emphasizes from now on that the core value of Taiwan's foreign aid initiative is humanitarianism.

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China (2009)

In consideration of the transformation from being an aid recipient to donor and the trends of international aid, Taiwan's foreign aid has made a shift in its strategy to progressive partnership and sustainable development, the two basis of its foreign aid policy. As we can see in the figures 4 and 5, the first basis –the partnership for progress- refers to the richer variety of partnerships that can be greatly cemented thanks to the Taiwanese strengthened cooperation and coordination with partner countries and international organizations. The second basis –the sustainable development- deals with following five of the UN's Millennium Development Goals (MDGs): eradication of extreme poverty and hunger; achievement of universal primary education; combat of HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; attainment of environmental sustainability; and establishment of a Global Partnership for Development.

Figure 4: Basis and objectives of Taiwan's foreign aid: Partnership for progress

Partnership for progress	
<i>Establishment of cooperation models that meet professional standards and ensure the co-prosperity of Taiwan and its allies</i>	<i>Diversifying partnerships while following global trends</i>
Taiwan hopes to raise cooperation with the 22 diplomatic allies that are developing countries, and remain the most important and closest partners in Taiwan's international cooperation, to new levels in a variety of fields through approaches that conform to international practices, meet professional standards and attain maximum effectiveness, thus advancing the prosperity of Taiwan and its allies.	Based on the principles of equality and reciprocity, the ROC government desires to join other donor countries, international development aid organizations, NGOs and other facets of the private sector in order to establish diverse, solid partnerships, by means of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthening coordination with donor countries and international organizations • Enhancing cooperation with NGOs • Combining the strengths of the private sector

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China (2009)

Figure 5: Basis and objectives of Taiwan's foreign aid: Sustainable development

Sustainable development					
<i>Eradicating extreme poverty and hunger</i>	<i>Strengthening the development of human resources</i>	<i>Combating infectious diseases and improving health care</i>	<i>Promoting environmental sustainability</i>	<i>Strengthening global partnerships for development</i>	
<p>Taiwan is willing to use its advanced agricultural know-how to help its diplomatic allies expand their food production, through:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assist in boosting agricultural output to meet food demand • Inject capital into the private sector to spur industrial growth 	<p>Having accumulated a vast pool of educational resources and earned a successful track record in occupational education, Taiwan assists its diplomatic allies in promoting universal education and nurturing a highly skilled and competent workforce, by means of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Advancing universal primary education • Assisting in the cultivation of highly skilled manpower • Reinforcing the links between occupational training and industrial development. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Diversify modes of cooperation • Strengthen cooperation with strategic partners 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assist in geographic information systems (GIS) applications, in which Taiwan has a highly proficient and experienced • Advance environmental protection programs • Promote waste-processing and recycling programs 	<p>Focused on UN's eighth MDG calling for the establishment of a Global Partnership for Development, Taiwan seeks to develop further an open trading and financial system; address the special needs of landlocked developing countries and small island developing states; and in cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications technologies. To achieve this goals, the Taiwanese government wants to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Respond to Aid for Trade (AfT) • Meet the special demands of small island countries 	

- Collaborate with the private sector in making available new technologies, such as information and communication technologies (ICT).

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China (2009)

Both basis of the Taiwan's foreign aid policy are connected with the flexible diplomacy and soft power strategy. The ROC's foreign strategy seeks to focus its aid on the civil society by means of wide range of mechanisms and institutions. Among all of them, it is useful to highlight the enhancing of Taiwanese cooperation with NGOs, a resource that fits well in public diplomacy approach, due to their relative freedom of political interference and detachment from interest groups. As the White Paper on Foreign Aid Policy (2009) states, some of Taiwan's civic organizations have become highly active in foreign aid initiatives in recent years. Accordingly to the MOFA's statistics, "a total of 20 Taiwan-based civic organizations, including the Buddha's Light International Association (ROC), Red Cross Society of the ROC, World Vision Taiwan, Taiwan Root Medical Peace Corps, and DDM Social Welfare and Charity Foundation donated a combined US\$71,914,350 in funds and supplies to developing countries in 2008" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China, 2009). In order to establishing a communication platform that can effectively integrate the private sector's international humanitarian assistance efforts, MOFA will continue to enhance its coordination with domestic NGOs and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) so as to share experiences and combine resources while assisting in international humanitarian assistance projects (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China, 2009).

Factors concerning Beijing's foreign policy, that lead Taiwan to apply public diplomacy approach in Latin America

As we have seen in this section, the strategy applied by Taipei in the international field is chiefly determined by the restrictions coming from the suppression of mainland China on ROC's foreign relations. This has influenced strongly ROC's rapprochement not only towards Latin American countries but also towards United States. Even though Taipei remains very close to its 12 diplomatic partners in Latin American and the Caribbean and has maintained cordial relations with them at present, it needs to reinforce its foreign policy by means of public diplomacy resources, because Taipei faces a set of challenges related to China influence in Latin America and extra-regional actors, as we will see in the next section.

III.FACTORS CONCERNING BEIJING'S FOREIGN POLICY THAT LEAD TAIWAN TO APPLY PUBLIC DIPLOMACY APPROACH IN LATIN AMERICA

3.1 The military threat, and political and economic pressure of mainland China over Taiwan

Since the foundation of the People's Republic of China in 1949, Taiwan has suffered the suppression of the former, which have fought a battle for the international diplomatic recognition of its sovereignty and independence from the PRC both in strategic geographic regions and multilateral institutions. Since then, Taiwan faces the threat of the Chinese invasion and a diplomatic enclosure that prevents it from accessing to intergovernmental organizations and participating normally in economic and finance international institutions. At present, the increasing political, economic and military power of mainland China in the international realm is making harder for Taiwan to resist the Chinese pressure for the reunification.

For the purpose of unifying Taiwan to mainland China, Beijing government's strategy relies on isolating Taiwan internationally, containing the pro-independence forces within Taiwan and integrating Taiwan economically (Hu, 1997). Being this the case, Taiwan has faced the military threat as well as political and economic pressure for decades. Each of them will be described as follows.

3.1.1 The military threat of a Chinese invasion to Taiwan

In the eyes of its political authorities, the PRC is the only one legitimate government of China, from which Taiwan is an integrant part. In effect, the PRC's constitution asserts that "Taiwan is part of the sacred territory of the People's Republic of China. It is the lofty duty of the entire Chinese people, including our compatriots in Taiwan, to accomplish the great task of reunifying the motherland" (The Peoples' Republic of China, 1982). Naturally, this implies for Chinese government that the ROC has ceased to exist. However, from the viewpoint of Taiwanese authorities, the ROC government exercises sovereignty over its territory and maintains diplomatic relations with other countries, on the basis of a democratic political system respectful of freedom and human rights, established in the Constitution of the Republic of China which was adopted in 1946 by the National Assembly and promulgated by the central government in 1947.

Taiwan has endeavoured to maintain its sovereignty, guarantee its security and expand its international space of subsistence and development, for which mainland China is the chief threat and biggest obstacle. Despite this permanent obstruction to achieve its foreign objectives, Taiwan does not look for a zero-sum competence with China; rather, it is willing to improve the bilateral dialogue on the basis of the reciprocity and mutual benefits principles (Pérez, 2004).

Nevertheless, the ROC is aware of the fact that, from the international legal perspective, mainland China can use its sovereignty power to justify any military action against the island while other states do not have the right to interfere because it is an issue of domestic politics of China. In fact, "technically, the PRC can declare the blockade as a military quarantine of the renegade Taiwan province. Action of quarantine is not an act of war, by attacks on enforcing Chinese ships or aircraft would be" (Hu, 1997, 380). Accordingly to Hu (1997), China's military aim of a blockade would be to diminish the Taiwan's logistical support and morale as well as subjugate its military resistance by closing Taiwanese ports and obstruct the movement of ships to enter or leave the island.

Beijing has developed a dual strategy of national reunification combining the military coercion and the peaceful inducement, reflecting an oscillating pattern of behaviour. The periods of military coercion cover since 1949 to 1979, and then again in 1995-1996, whereas we can find the peaceful inducement between 1979 and 1995, and since 1997 until now. During the first period of military coercion, China planned to liberate Taiwan by force; in effect, in April of 1950, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) started to prepare for the invasion of the island, which was suspended by the outbreak of the Korean War that year in the context of the Cold War. After that false try, Beijing continued to threaten the use of force and endeavoured two military crises in the Taiwan Strait in 1954 and 1958 (Zhao, 1999/2000).

The second period of military coercion lasted from 1995 to 1996, when the PLA conducted successive waves of calculated military exercises in the Taiwan Strait from July 1995 and March 1996, among them those executed during the last year had a scale and intensity, and used a firepower and sophisticated weapons never seen before in this conflict, representing an escalation from the series of exercises conducted in 1995 (Hu, 1997). In July 1995, the PLA launched a set of surface-to-surface ballistic missile tests in the East China Sea (just 150 km off the northern Taiwan), then other in August and in November (Zhao, 1999/2000). In 1996, the PLA conducted another three waves of joint ground, naval and air military exercises, missiles were launched at target areas, the PLA Air Force showed off some of its advanced weapons and Navy's several latest models of frigates, and developed a simulation of cross-strait landing operation at the end of the cycle of exercises in March of 1996 (Hu, 1997 and Zhao, 1999/2000). After the re-election of Lee Teng-hui as Taiwan's President, Beijing declared its successful conclusion of the military exercises, and the war, fortunately, did not break out, but they attained to exploit "Taiwan's fear of war through military brinkmanship", and demonstrated Beijing government's "resolution and willingness to escalate to high levels of military action if necessary" (Zhao, 1999/2000, 498).

Beijing's war games were conducted with clear political purposes: to urge Taiwanese government to halt what China perceived as independent tendencies and send it a strong and taxative message that the PRC will not tolerate if Taiwan insists on the road of independence (Hu, 1997). Beijing also sought for influencing the political agenda of Taipei, specifically in the election of Lee Teng-hui as President. As Zhao (2000) stated it, "people who voted for Lee are not necessary supporters of independence and 'pragmatic diplomacy'. A large number of constituents voted for Lee, because they did not like Peng Minmin's independence pursuit, which, after Beijing's military exercises, they believe would lead to catastrophe" (Hu, 1997, 377).

Other political purpose of Beijing's military exercises was to warn the U.S. to stop what the PRC perceived as intervention in Chinese internal affairs. In fact, in accordance with Suisheng Zhao (2000), "Beijing restored priority to military coercion in 1995-1996 because it concluded that the Taiwan authorities and pro-Taiwan independence forces in foreign countries, particularly in the U.S., were collaborating to perpetuate Taiwan's political separation from China" (Zhao, 1999/2000, 506). Furthermore, Jiang Zemin, in 2004, in a declaration about the potential use of force to thwart Taiwan independence, he asserted that he rejected any promise not to use force against independence activities in his eight-point proposal, but he added that "any such force would not be directed at our compatriots in Taiwan but against the foreign forces who intervene in China's reunification and go in for the independence of Taiwan" (Romberg, 2008, 3).

Taiwan has had to deal with these sorts of threats that Beijing has sent them permanently. The PRC has repeatedly stated that it will never renounce to the use of force as long as Taipei does not accept the reunification. But, despite Beijing's determined insistence, it has never specified clearly and only in vague terms, under what conditions would considerer the use of force. Accordingly to Weixing Hu (1997), analysts speculate that Beijing could probably resort to use force under the following circumstances: Taiwan declares de jure independence, foreign countries intervene in Taiwan affairs and assist Taiwan to become independent, there is severe internal disorder in the island and things get out of control, and Taiwan is prepared to indefinitely delay the reunification talks. Undoubtedly, after listening to Beijing's declarations, we can affirm that the resort to force is inevitable if Taipei declares independence, but, as the author says, "Beijing has yet to clarify what constitutes the circumstances of severe disorder and foreign intervention. It could be foreign invasion of Taiwan, military alliance with other countries, or domestic uprisings, etc." (Hu, 1997, 380). Whatever the force will be used, it would the minimal use of force in a form of coercive diplomacy. In Weixing Hu's (1997) point of view, Beijing's aim is to bend Taiwan's will and bring it back to negotiation, but not to destroy the island and slaughter innocent people.

Notwithstanding Chinese leaders considers that peaceful reunification is the most desirable approach, this approach has never excluded the potential use of force as the last resort in their minds. In the words of Suisheng Zhao (2000), "this preference for peaceful resolution should not lead to an underestimation of the danger of war across the Taiwan Strait or a conclusion that a war with Taiwan is unthinkable for Beijing (...). Beijing has reiterated, in a non-ambiguous way, that, to safeguard national unity and territorial integrity, it will not give up the use of force should the situation require it" (pp. 509 y 510).

Taiwanese fears about Beijing's intentions are confirmed by the permanent military modernization carried by mainland China, which can achieve the international supremacy in this field in the Taiwan Strait in the near future. As it is explicitly stated by the Annual Report to the U.S. Congress concerning the military power of PRC in 2008, "the pace and scope of China's military transformation have increased in recent years, fuelled by acquisition of advanced foreign weapons, continued high rates of investment in its domestic defense and science and technology industries, and far reaching organizational and doctrinal reforms of the armed forces" (Department of Defense of the United States of America, 2008). In addition to the fact that China posses one of the biggest army in the world, exceeding the 2.000.000 soldiers, China is modernizing its nuclear force, as it is evidenced by the fielding of new intercontinental-range missiles, enhancing its strategic strike capabilities. China has been developing advanced cruise missiles, medium-range ballistic missiles, anti-ship ballistic missiles designed to strike ships at sea, including aircraft carriers; and, besides, it executed a successful test of a direct-ascent, anti-satellite weapon in 2007, which expands Chinese capabilities from the traditional battlefield into the space and cyber-space domains (Military Power of the People's Republic of China, 2008). As a consequence, due to Beijing's great military power, which has the greatest potential to even compete with the United States and field disruptive military technologies, it is possible for its army to carry out a blockade operation.

3.1.2 The Chinese political pressure over Taiwan government and its political allies in Latin America

The political pressure of mainland China over Taiwan has been overwhelming, exhausting and continuous. In several official documents and authorities' statements, the PRC has

declared its unrefusable position in relation to Taiwan political status. In 1993, Beijing's reunification policy included four basic principles that reassert this position: One China; One country, Two Systems; a highly autonomous Taiwan; and peaceful negotiation. In opinion of Weixing Hu (1997), the last principle results to be the most ambiguous because it suggests that within the framework of One China, everything can be negotiable, but the Chinese state can use all necessary means, including military ones, to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

One example of this ambiguous attitude of mainland China could be seen in the conference celebrated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in May of 1998, devoted to Taiwan affairs. In that occasion, it was decided supposedly to take step to push for the negotiations with the island but giving to Taiwan a wider room for international movement or the authorization to Taiwanese political authorities to invite them to China, which, in the eyes of anyone, are the rights of Taiwanese people. As Suisheng Zhao (2000) affirms, "as the first step, it suggested procedural talks about the topics and places for the formal negotiation. If Taiwan came to the negotiation table, Beijing would even consider giving Taiwan more international space under the principle in Taiwan, including the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which has advocated Taiwan independence. Taiwan affairs officials in various provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions would be allowed to invite members of various Taiwanese parties and factions to the mainland to exchange views" (p. 499).

Another example is the famous eight-point proposal made by Jiang Zemin in 1995 about the reunification process, among which direct negotiation for finishing bilateral hostilities under "One China" principle is the most important condition. The proposal's points are resumed as follows: (1) Adhere to the principle of one China is the basis and prerequisite for peaceful reunification; (2) do not have objections to the development of nongovernmental economic and cultural ties between Taiwan and other countries; (3) stand to hold negotiations with Taiwan authorities on the peaceful reunification of the motherland; (4) try to achieve the peaceful reunification of China since Chinese should not fight Chinese; (5) spare no effort to develop economic exchange and cooperation between the two sides separated by the Taiwan Straits so that both sides enjoy a flourishing economy and the whole Chinese nation benefits; (6) people on both sides should jointly inherit and carry forward the fine traditions of the culture; (7) hope that Taiwan Island enjoys social stability, economic growth and affluence, as well as that all political parties in Taiwan will adopt a sensible, forward-looking and constructive attitude and promote the expansion of relations between the two sides; and (8) welcome leaders of Taiwan to visit the mainland in their proper status (The People's Republic of China, 1995).

However, it is worth noting how Beijing imposes its conditions against the exercise of Taiwan's sovereignty. For instance, the declaration's first point states that China's sovereignty and territorial integrity must never be allowed to suffer division; it resolutely opposes any statement and action for creating "the independence of Taiwan". In the second point, it also asserts that Beijing opposes Taiwan's activities in "expanding its living space internationally," aimed at creating "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan." And, in the third one, China suggests that as a first step to negotiate, negotiations should be held and an agreement reached on ending officially the state of hostility between the two sides under the principle that there is only one China.

After this eight-point's declaration, Taiwan responded to Beijing by a Lee Teng-hui's six-point that disappointed Beijing because Lee asked China to acknowledge the reality of

divided rule between two Chinas and then he could discuss the issue of the reunification, demanded also that Beijing had to give up to the use of force against Taiwan as a prerequisite for talks between both parts (Zhao, 1999/2000). This made Beijing's frustration to grow and triggered the second phase of Chinese military exercises against the island between 1995 and 1996. Despite Taiwan's refusal to accept Beijing conditions, the eight points for peaceful negotiations were even emphatically reaffirmed by Jiang Zemin in his political report to the 15th CCP National Congress of 1997, stressing the need to adhere to the basic principle for the peaceful reunification relied on one country and two systems (Zhao, 1999/2000).

Afterwards, with Hu Jintao's accession to power in mainland China, Beijing continued its series of statements and documents suppressing the right of Taiwan to achieve its independence and international recognition as a sovereign state. In March of 2005, Hu Jintao offered a speech setting forth now a "four-point guideline" for handling cross-Strait relations, in which Beijing still reiterates the existence of only "One China". These four points are: Never waver in adhering to the "one China" principle; never abandon efforts to seek peaceful reunification; never change the principle of placing hope on the Taiwan people, and never compromise in opposing "Taiwan independence" secessionist activities (Romberg, 2008). At the same time, the Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan reaffirmed its government's commitment to strive for prospect of peaceful reunification but warned that Beijing "is determined, able, and prepared to check 'Taiwan independence' and major incidents leading to 'Taiwan independence' so as to resolutely defend our state sovereignty and territorial integrity" (Romberg, 2008, 11).

One of the Chinese official texts that have caused the most controversial in cross-Strait relations was the Anti-Secession Law, which was put into effect in 2005. This document formalized the long-standing policy of the PRC to stop the Taiwan independence movement from splitting the country, to maintain that the one China principle is the basis for resolution of the issue, and to use non-peaceful means against the Taiwan independence in the event of a declaration of Taiwanese independence. In fact, in its article eight, Beijing established the conditions under which it will use non-peaceful and other necessary measures to protect China's sovereignty and territorial integrity. These conditions are: (1) if Taiwan's secessionist forces accomplish the fact of Taiwan's secession from China, (2) or if a major incident occurs which would entail Taiwan's separation from China, (3) or if all possibility for a peaceful unification is exhausted (The People's Republic of China, 2005). Taipei responded that through Anti-Secession Law the PRC was "threatening regional peace and security by seeking to unilaterally change the status quo, escalating tensions, and violating international law in suppressing free, democratic, sovereign, and independent Taiwan" (Romberg, 2008, 8).

Along with this pressure through statements, speeches and official documents about the One China principle, Beijing has achieved other states and international organization to withdrawal their support and diplomatic recognition to Taiwan sovereignty. Two of the most tragic withdrawals of support to Taipei were those of the United Nations and the United States, when Beijing took over Taipei's seat in the UN General Assembly and the Security Council in 1971, and, eight years after, when the United States switched its diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing: both regrettable events isolated Taiwan in the international arena (Zhao, 1999/2000).

From now on, the PRC begin to find the way to exercise its overwhelming political power to pressure over Taipei's allies to cut off official ties with it. The same strategy has wielded

Beijing in Latin America, which has transformed in the Taipei-Beijing's battlefield. At present, mainland China has conquered the official support of 21 countries in the region: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Bahamas, Cuba, Dominica, Granada, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago in the Caribbean; Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Uruguay, Peru, Surinam, and Venezuela in South America; Costa Rica in Central America; and México in North America (considered also as part of Latin American region).

As we can see, in Central America Beijing has only one ally that is Costa Rica. That's why the PRC has been making significant inroads in Panama, one of the most strategically significant countries in this sub-region for Beijing; because it is the largest user of the Canal and bilateral trade is booming (Mendelson Forman & Moreira, 2008). The case of Nicaragua is particularly worrying for Taiwan, since the President Daniel Ortega has declared he would be open to making friends with all nations, including China; and, despite the cordial relations with Taipei during his administration, recently there have been rumours about Nicaragua has attempted to switch recognition to Beijing (Mendelson Forman & Moreira, 2008).

In South America, especially in the case of Paraguay, an actual Taipei's ally and so a key target for the PRC, Beijing requested to Argentina and Brazil's governments to persuade the Paraguayan President, Nicanor Duarte, to recognize Beijing and thus advance relations between China and Mercosur (Rodríguez, 2008). But now the possibility for Taiwan to maintain its only ally in South America is being threatened by the desire expressed by the newly President Fernando Lugo of expanding links with China, and the fact that Paraguay's membership of Mercosur prevents it from signing an Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Taipei without the respective approvals from all other Mercosur members, which is a serious obstacle to the deepening of bilateral trade (Mendelson Forman & Moreira, 2008).

In the Caribbean, something similar has happened to Saint Lucia, in the Caribbean. Saint Lucia has switched sides twice: the first time was after thirteen years of relations with Taiwan, when the opposition, the Labour Party, won the elections in 1997, and the second was ten years later in 2007, when the United Workers Party returned to power and its government restored official ties with the island (Mendelson Forman & Moreira, 2008). During this second period of relations with Taipei, Saint Lucia's government has denounced that the PRC asked the leaders of Saint Lucia's allies in the Caribbean region and to the Caribbean Community's General Secretary to avoid establishing relations with Taiwan (Rodríguez, 2008).

Granada is another example of the pressure Beijing exercises over third countries in Latin America. In 2005, the Granada's government explained the rupture of relations with Taiwan due to the policy adopted by the Caribbean Community, which recognizes the PRC as the only one Chinese nation (Rodríguez, 2008).

Under Haiti, a political ally of Taipei, Beijing has wielded an enormous pressure since 2004: Beijing leveraged its permanent-member status on the UN Security Council to prevent the Taiwanese Premier from attending the inauguration of Haitian President René Préval in May of 2006; China contributed 600 police officers to the MINUSTAH and, furthermore, "China also threatened not to renew the Security Council mandate for MINUSTAH in 2007 because Haiti's UN Ambassador asked the General Assembly to consider Taiwan for permanent UN membership" (Mendelson Forman & Moreira, 2008, 5). The case of this country is also worrying because Haiti is the poorest country in the region and depends much on the monetary support of the international community, making its authorities to be

very susceptible to accept Chinese's offers of aid.

Despite the wide support attained by Taipei in Central America and the Caribbean, this Taiwanese success is being threatened by Beijing's strong influence on Hugo Chávez's administration in Venezuela and Chávez's influence on Central American and Caribbean countries. Chávez is using the alliance Petrocaribe as a mechanism to pressure its members to give their support to the PRC. Petrocaribe, launched in 2005 by President Hugo Chávez is an agreement of energetic cooperation compound by Venezuela and some Caribbean and Central American states with the purpose of its members can buy Venezuelan oil under favourable conditions. The problem we can easily notice is that among its fifteen members, five are Taiwan's political allies: Dominican Republic, Belize, Saint Lucia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.

The Venezuelan strategy, nourished by the discredited and weak G. W. Bush's foreign policy in Latin American, is monopolizing the use power of its energetic resources as a tool for negotiating. "Both Beijing and Caracas employ the oil factor to catch local governments' eyes on energetic assistance (in the case of Venezuela) or the investment for exploiting hydrocarbons (in the case of China)" (Cardozo, 2008). Through Venezuela, in South America, and Cuba, in the Caribbean -key PRC's political allies- China is not only trying to destroy Taipei's coalition in the region but also is trying that its main Caribbean allies -Venezuela and Cuba- to become a lobby group that obstructs the way for Taipei's recognition initiatives in the region (Cardozo, 2008).

3.1.3 The economic power of China in Latin America

Even mainland China remains a developing nation –with 800 million of the nation's 1.3 billion citizens- remain farmers and many stuck in poverty (Wines & Wong, 2009) and some scholars would be careful calling it a superpower, the economic power of Beijing in the international landscape is increasing in a spectacular manner. At present, China is a major global economy, having effects on international economics and finance, and it is expected by experts to pass Japan's as the world's second largest economy in the world. China has launched itself to markets of developing countries to invest and buy companies belonging to crucial industries, such as those related to raw materials, energy and natural resources.

The political penetration of China in Latin America also entails the economic and commercial conquest of many important Latin American economies; Chinese main partners in the region are, accordingly to this order: Brazil, Mexico, Chile and Argentina (Ríos, 2006). More than the 30 per cent of the Chinese foreign investment is addressed to the region. Among the Latin American exports to China, more than the 70 per cent are primary products and manufactures based on natural resources, whereas China exports to the region medium and high technology goods (Ríos, 2006). It is widely recognized the economic complementarities between mainland China and practically all of the Latin American countries, since they converge in several fields and achieve to articulate truly South-South cooperation (Ríos, 2006).

This strong economic maneuver room of Beijing in Latin America is a huge problem for Taiwan, because it has to fight against a giant who, apparently, does not want to stop growing. Evidently, the PRC has successfully used this insurmountable advantage to reduce Taiwan's regional support. The Taipei-Beijing's battle in Latin America exploded this decade when China signed FTAs with some Latin American states and increased diplomatic ties, trade and investment stunningly. Hu Jintao has visited to the region,

compromising investments and more cooperation. In general, the Chinese aid for development is based on material and financial assistance to deteriorated economies in many areas; for example, in the designing and implementation of educational programs, medical assistance, technical cooperation fishing and mining, building hydroelectric plants, telecommunications, agriculture, and energetic resources, among many other areas (Cardozo, 2008). These promises aim to gain more political allies against Taiwan's sovereignty and have translated into huge and attractive amounts of monetary transferences, and aid for development, which is very valuable and necessary for many developing Latin American countries.

All these economic and commercial advantages of trading with mainland China deter Latin American governments from maintain or establish formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan. This is something that Taipei has to deal with every day, and it is likely to face in the future, in its attempt to maintain its political allies in the region.

3.2 Chinese strategy of soft power in the international system as a tool for projecting a peaceful and friendly image in Latin America, and adding political allies

During the actual post Cold War era, mainland China has understood that its economic development depends to a greater degree on a peaceful and stable international context and to which its foreign policy should adjust so as to deploy a peaceful international profile. Since then, Chinese government have launched a discourse of harmony and international peace, based on the diffusion of Confucian values, and on public diplomacy and soft power strategy.

The so-called “guiding principle of twenty-four characters” proposed by Deng Xiaoping - based on the recommendations: observe world events with a calm mind, stand firmly, confront difficulties with confidence, keep a low profile, never assume a leadership role and take action- that represent the priorities of the PRC's foreign policy for a new period in its international relations, it is drawn out from the Confucian philosophy, which is the basis of the Chinese civilization and culture (Shinxue, 2008). On Confucianism -the ancient Chinese philosophy that has been its dominant ideology during more than two thousand years- are laid the principles and guidelines of China's foreign policy, because it settles the harmony at the center of the human being lives and the political system.

Chinese leaders have echoed Confucius themes and have communicated instructions to the government members to follow the Confucian principles. In this manner, President Hu Jintao instructed Chinese parties, in 2005, to build a “harmonious society” and promote “values of honesty and unity, as well as forge a closer relationship between the people and the government” (Bell, 2008, 9). In the same way, the following year, in 2006, the Communist Party stated that “social harmony is the intrinsic nature of the socialism with Chinese Characteristics and an important guarantee of the country's prosperity, the nation's rejuvenation, and the people's happiness”.[‡]

Some Chinese scholars, such as Zhao Tingyang, have spoken of new role for the PRC in the international system as a state that is becoming “a power that is responsible to the world, a power that is different from various empires in the world history” (Bell, 2008, 24). It is supposed that Chinese state must viewed as the promoter in the international concert

[‡] Communist Party of China, communiqué of the Sixth Plenum of the 16th CPC Central Committee, October 11, 2006, cited in Jiang Shinxue (2008), p. 33.

of a soft power based on Confucianism values such as modesty, tolerance and willingness to learn, and must concern about the well-being of outsiders as well as offer a common solution to global problems (Bell, 2008). According to Confucian principles, Chinese state must create “a harmonious political order of global peace” (Bell, 2008, 26) or a “Great Harmony”, which means to promote “international peace while allowing for legitimate national self-interest that can sometimes outweigh cosmopolitan ideals” (Bell, 2008, 27), and resolving conflicts by peaceful means.

Therefore, Beijing’s new global strategy has been relying on soft power so that it could face the hard power of other major world powers like United States, Japan, Europe Union and Russia, as well as to gain a greater support from developing nations and Latin American countries. In this sense, Chinese government has tried to “strengthen dialogue and communication, enhance political mutual trust, expand strategic common ground, and continue to show understanding and support on issues involving each other's core interests and major concerns” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China, 2008), by intensifying people-to-people exchanges in the political, economic, cultural and touristic fields. Specifically, in the political realm, mainland China has deployed an assertive and effective soft power strategy by means of high-levels contacts, exchanges between political parties and cooperation in international affairs.[§] Thus, Beijing’s authorities developed a strong strategy of a face-to-face relation with leaders of Latin America at key junctures during last decade, and namely Brazil and Mexico since 2008. Obviously, this strategy of soft power aims at fostering its economic ties with Latin America, chiefly in trade, investment and cooperation in resources, energy and infrastructure construction.^{**} At the same time, Beijing has financed Latin American state projects in public enterprises in key areas of production by gaining the trust of regional authorities; as a result, China has become a much more significant trade partner for the majority of the countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.

This is the foundations of foreign policy of mainland China and its direct relation with the ideals of “harmonious world”, soft power and the Chinese Confucian philosophy. However, Beijing’s strategy of soft power can be perfectly criticized by Taiwanese people. As we know, mainland China maintains a double discourse: on the one hand, its government sustains that it must build a “harmonious society” and promote the values of honesty and unity, but, on the other hand, it refuses to recognize Taiwan sovereignty and, what turns out to be worse, is that Chinese government maintains a permanent military threat to Taiwan. Nevertheless, mainland China has successfully applied this strategy in the international landscape to the detriment of Taiwan.

3.3 Beijing’s influence on Latin America through South-South Coalitions and its extra-regional allies

In accordance with Beijing’s strategy used in Latin America to gain more political allies against the recognition of Taiwan’s sovereignty, mainland China has led some of new South-South Coalitions –such as the G-20 of developing countries and the BRIC countries- as well as it has developed strong political relationships with other extra-regional powers –like Iran and India- that are looking for Latin American natural resources and a bigger room of manoeuvre. These alliances entail another obstacle Taiwan has to face in

[§] For a detail of the set of political actions of China’s government in Latin America, see <http://www.fmprc.gov.cl>.

^{**} For a detail of the set of economic and commercial actions of China’s government in Latin America, see <http://www.fmprc.gov.cl>.

this region.

3.3.1 Beijing's conformation of South-South Coalition with Latin American countries

3.3.1.1 G-20 of developing countries:

If we take the definition of Narlikar (2003) of "alliance" -that is, coalitions of self-interested governments who meet to response to a specific threat, so once the threat is gone, the group disbands- the G-20 of developing countries is an alliance created for the instrumental objective of reducing the agricultural subsidies. The Group of 20 of developing countries was established in 2003 in the context of the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference, which took place in Cancun (Mexico), in order to open agricultural negotiations and defend developing countries' interests; since then, the coalition has held an array of Ministerial Meetings^{††}. At present, the group is compound by 23 members geographically distributed in accordance with a equitable fashion: 5 members of Africa (Egypt, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania and Zimbabwe), 6 of Asia (China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Philippines and Thailand) and 12 of Latin America (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela) (Web site of G-20 of developing countries).

In the context of the cross-Strait conflict, China's membership in the G-20 of developing countries has to be considered as an another key instrument for the PRC to get involve with other states, establishing closer relationships, and thus having more opportunities to influence over them. The G-20 of developing countries has strengthened as a recognized and key interlocutor in the agriculture negotiations, and also has obtained a considerable legitimacy thanks to its capacity to coordinate its members and interact with other coalitions in the framework of WTO negotiations rounds. These are the benefits of belonging to this groups that its Latin American members value and need to gain bargaining power in the international landscape. Among its Latin American members, we can find that almost each of them is political ally of Beijing, except Guatemala and Paraguay. Therefore, on one hand, this intergovernmental organization is a crucial place where Latin American countries have the possibility to negotiate as a group together with the important support of emerging middle powers, such China, Brazil, India and South Africa, in front of rich countries. And on the other hand, these advantages of belonging to the G-20 of developing countries make it perfect scenery for Beijing exercises its pressure over Taipei's political allies (Paraguay and Guatemala) and also over the rest of the members that maintain formal diplomatic relations with the mainland.

3.3.1.2 BRIC countries:

BRIC is an alliance compounded by four developing countries: Brazil, Russia, India and China, which held its first summit of heads of state in June of 2008 in Russia. BRIC countries are seeking for more influence on global financial affairs, a greater voice and representation in international financial institutions, and a more diversified international currency system. They also reject the protectionism, and support energy stability and sustainability. Besides, they have called for UN reform, and reaffirmed India and Brazil's ambitions for permanent membership of the UN Security Council. Despite they are developing countries, this is a powerful group due to their respective annual Gross Domestic Product of 2008: 4.4 trillion dollars for China, 1.7 trillion dollars for Russia, 1.6 trillion dollars for Brazil and 1.2 trillion dollars for India, and also due to their massive

^{††} Cancun and Brasilia (2003); São Paulo (2004); New Delhi, Bhurban, Geneva, Hong Kong (2005); Geneva (2006); Geneva (2007); and Geneva (2008), along with technical meetings aimed to discuss proposals in the context of WTO agricultural negotiations (Web site of G-20 of developing countries).

sovereign reserves: “China holds almost 2 trillion dollars in foreign reserves -nearly 70% of the BRIC total- to Russia's 404 billion, India's 262 billion and Brazil's 206 billion dollars” (Oxford Analytica, 2009).

As we can see, China outranks the other economies of the group and appears to be the most pre-eminent partner. Brazil, India and Russia are key sources for China, which are playing a sort of counterweight in relations to China's power. This creates a tight relationship between China and the rest of the partners. In fact, China's trade with Brazil rises 63%; with India, 34%; and with Russia, 18% (Oxford Analytica, 2009).

The participants of the group useful for our analysis are Brazil, naturally, but also India, because of its increasing relations with Latin America. By means of the BRIC construct, Brazil seeks to improve its commercial opportunities, and increase trade and economic cooperation. Brazil is one of the world's most efficient agricultural producers and the largest exporter of a range of products, and China is definitively one of the best trade partners. Evidently, in the eyes of Beijing, the BRIC represents a forum to positioning on international affairs and reinforcing its influence, but also it can be considered as another instrument of its diplomacy to strengthen relations with Latin American political allies, such as Brazil. Therefore, if for Brazil the BRIC alliance lets it to build an international profile as leader among developing countries and improve its leadership in Latin America, for mainland China, the BRIC construct represents a means to gain more influence on one of the most powerful countries in South America, that is, Brazil.

3.3.2 Presence of other Beijing's extra-regional allies in Latin America competing for a bigger room of influence and resources

In this section, it will be argued that Beijing's has taken advantaged of its tight ties with extra-regional actors that have showed a closer relation with Latin American nations during the last years, such as Iran and India, to have a bigger room of manoeuvre and influence on its regional allies and Taipei's allies.

3.3.2.1 Iran:

Increasing presence of Iranian political authorities shows the emerging alliance between Teheran and a group of Latin American states. In very recent years, Iran has surprisingly get close to a wide set of Latin American countries, such as Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, Uruguay, Chile, Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, Nicaragua and Ecuador, being some of them anti-U.S. government and, obviously, Beijing's political allies, with the exception of Nicaragua. Iran has deployed intensive high level diplomatic activities, established bilateral agreements and a coordinated participation in international fora, so as to find allies and partners in the international arena. In this manner, Iran has used its economic, gas and oil resources to reinforce its ties with regional and emerging powers, such as China, India, among others.

The Iranian strategy is based on a triangulation policy, that is, a set of alliances between Iran-Venezuela and a Latin American country. The triangulations established are with Bolivia, Nicaragua, Cuba, for example. The central axis in the region is naturally Venezuela –a big Beijing's ally in South America-, which has been the engine of the Teheran's rapprochement in Latin America. Both heads of state have had a frenetic bilateral diplomatic activity since this decade, and have subscribed a near of 200 bilateral agreements in key productive sectors, such as oil and energy (Bermúdez, 2008). With Bolivia Iran reinforced its ties at the moment President Evo Morales was elected, since then Teheran

has showed his willing to help Bolivia to develop in different areas (education, agriculture, gas and oil) (Bermúdez, 2008). In the case of Nicaragua, bilateral relations were re-launched during the administration of President Daniel Ortega, since then both governments have held high level visit to cement the basis for cooperation in energy, housing, sanitary and health areas (Bermúdez, 2008). With Cuba Iran maintains a tight political tuning, particularly in international affairs, characterized by a anti-imperialist discourse in favour the configuration of a multipolar world; since this decade, Teheran give an impulse to its relations with the Caribbean island which was materialized in more than 30 bilateral agreements; they have also compromised to cooperate in the political, economic, commercial, cultural, energetic, agricultural and fishing fields, among many others (Bermúdez, 2008).

As a result, we can notice, on the one hand, the increasingly tighter ties that Iran is establishing with Latin American countries, especially with those expressing a anti-American discourse, and on the other, the opening of opportunities for Beijing to reinforce its ties with Latin American political allies through the increasing influence of Iran on them.

3.3.2.2 India:

The inclusion of India in this analysis has to do with the initiatives of its government to strengthen relations with Latin American countries, and the tight relations China has with India. As we saw above, both China and India are involved in the both coalitions described, in BRIC countries and also in the G-20 of developing countries. India and Latin America are intensively looking for commercial opportunities.

During this decade, India has demonstrated to be one of the fastest-growing major economies, going through a deep process of integration in the global economy (The Goldman Sachs Global Economics Department, 2007). That is why the relevance of Latin America for the economic strategic of Indian firms is increasingly greater. Along with the net of bilateral agreements signed between India and a set of Latin American countries, several initiatives have been designed. Already in 1997, the Indian government defined a plan aiming at deepening economic relations with the region, and coordinating public and private sectors so as to promote exports towards Indian main regional partners, in areas such as textile, artesany, chemical products, software and medicines (Cesarin, 2007).

The Partial Scope Agreement between India and Mercosur aims at improving the actual pattern of trade and designing another one focused on technological exchanges, investment and creation of joint enterprises in different mutual interest sectors, like hydroelectric energy, nuclear energy, ethanol, compressed natural gas, telecommunications, chemical industry, and pharmaceutical products. This was the first agreements signed by the Mecosur with a developing Asian country (Cesarin, 2007).

Among the sectors of trade, we must highlight the mining and the energy sectors, because of the attraction they generate among India investors. In the mining sector, India has promised millionaire investments in South America. In the energy sector, as India is the sixth energy consumer in the world and the second largest producer of sugar cane in the world, behind Brazil, Latin America has become a potential partner for the Asian country and Brazil one of its favorite. For example, Brazilian enterprises have developed projects of ethanol in India and signed agreements concerning renewable sources of energy, in favor of Brazilian strategy for promoting ethanol and biodiesel consumption (Cesarin, 2007).

Therefore, due to the fact that India, on the one hand, is improving its economic and political ties with Latin American and, on the other, China has emerged as India's largest trading partner, replacing even the United States, Beijing has a key political ally in the region to pressure over them to gain a greater support and also pressure over Taipei's Latin American allies to get the recognition.

In sum, as we can see, Taiwanese diplomats in Latin America have to pay attention not only to Chinese activities of its diplomacy in Latin America but also to the kind of relationships that China is establishing with Latin American political allies in international coalitions, such as the G-20 of developing countries and the BRIC countries, and with extra-regional actors that are Beijing's political allies and that are tightening relationships with the region, like Iran and India.

IV. HOW PUBLIC DIPLOMACY APPROACH CAN FOSTER TAIWAN'S POLITICAL'S SUPPORT IN LATIN AMERICA, AND HOW IT CAN BE APPLIED IN CHILE

In order to expand its international space of survival, Taiwan needs to count on the political support of Latin American states. As we have underlined, this region is the battleground of Beijing and Taipei in their fight for obtaining the international recognition. In Latin America, most of Taiwan's political allies are concentrated especially in the Central America and the Caribbean, so this region is a jewel that Taipei must look after. To reinforce this objective, Beijing has deployed a sophisticated soft power strategy, and developed a net of allies by means of creating and heading southern collations and strengthening its ties with relevant extra-regional actors in Latin America and the Caribbean, as we have stated here. In consideration of these obstacles, in this section, the objective is to explain how public diplomacy and new public diplomacy can allow Taiwan foreign policy to improve its ties with Latin American countries and Chile.

4.1 How public diplomacy can foster Taiwan's support in Latin America

As we have stated in this work, public diplomacy refers to the capacity to influence on a foreign government's behavior in an indirect way, exercising influence on its citizen's attitudes, and it is based on information, education and culture (Noya, 2007). In other words, it is to build confidence, relations and long-lasting ties with the civil society of other societies so that our values can be recognized by them, overcoming the cultural barriers. The link between this concept and our case of study is that the main objective of public diplomacy, or more specifically, new public diplomacy, is to create channels of communications that go under the formal diplomacy and can influence on it positively. That is to say, for the special case of restrictions Taiwan faces in the international arena to establish and maintain diplomatic relations with other countries imposed by mainland China, this approach is a key mechanism to try to influence on other states by means other than formal and diplomatic ones.

Since the decade of 1990, we have been eyewitnesses of the media explosion and the information revolution, creating a complex environment focused on information and knowledge, in which citizens, non-governmental organizations, private enterprises, the civil society in general, have augmented its participation in international affairs and foreign policy, a realm exclusively dominated by diplomats and political high level authorities and that now is increasingly democratized (Bátora, 2005). Some scholars have stated that we are living a shift in political paradigms from the modern word of geopolitics to a postmodern

world of images and influence, where power not only stems from coercion but also from information sharing and attraction, that is, the foundations of soft power, which is the chief objective of public diplomacy (Bátora, 2005). In the International Relations discipline, this new international context is leading us to change from the paradigm of *realpolitik* to *noopolitik*, based on the creation of networks, non-state actors, networks of allies, positive sum games, harmony of interests, cooperation, shared interests and aims (Noya, 2007).

For that reason, public diplomacy is implemented through the involvement of multiple actors and organizations –NGOs, politicians, artists, political parties, writers, journalists, business people, media groups, enterprises, academia, etc-, a wide group from civil society that go beyond those of the government; as Bátora (2005) suggests, “public diplomacy comprises all activities by state and non-state actors that contribute to the maintenance and promotion of a country’s soft power” (p. 2).

Thus, this new political and social environment demands a shift also in the basis of public diplomacy strategy to an approach of networks, at the micro level, of social capital or relational, such an association or permanent guideline for social interaction (Noya, 2007). Specifically, accordingly Bátora (2005) explains, this entails that the state needs to be attractive not only to foreigners but also to actors inside the state so that they -the latter- can promote its soft power abroad, and, in this way, the state can capture the mind space of foreign audience.

As the rest of small and medium-sized states, Taiwan can take advantage of this approach. Even though, public diplomacy is usually related with great powers, like United States and URSS during the Cold War, this approach is more necessary for small and middle powers than for superpowers, because they depend on other states’ willing more than their own capacities so as to keep their national independence and increase their influence on public opinion (Noya, 2007). That is why, public diplomacy offers an opportunity for small and medium-sized states to gain influence and shape international political agenda overcoming the obstacles imposed by their restrictive hard power and resources (Bátora, 2005).

More specifically, as it is resumed in the figure 6, small and medium-sized states have the mission to capturing attention of other states or international community, whereas major powers concentrates on changing images and re-branding, explaining or advocacy; with respect to the volume and breadth of images and messages, small and medium-sized states generally focus their scarce resources on few niche-areas, whereas major states have a larger reservoir of images and messages that they represent; and, finally, in contrast with major powers which have considerable hard power resources to keep their legitimacy, small and medium-sized states have to manage attractive causes -like peacemaking, aid for development, human security, etc.- to gain support in the international landscape (Bátora, 2005).

Figure 6: Difference between public diplomacy of major power, and small and medium-sized states

	Major powers	Small and medium powers
Mission	Advocacy	Capture attention
Volume and breadth of images and messages	High (a broad array of messages and images)	Low (a few niche message and images)
Outlet legitimacy	Low	High

Source: Bátorá (2005)

One of the most important advantages of this approach for the case of Taiwan as for many other small and middle powers is that it includes the development of a niche-area. The so-called niche diplomacy refers to the specialization of diplomatic resources on specific topics and geographic areas and the careful selection of messages and actions so as to exploit their comparative advantages (Noya, 2007).

In its most deep aspect, public diplomacy aims at projecting an image in the public opinion of another state or in the international community. It is widely known that images of states are a very important factor for their mutual relationships. “Country’s images correspond to past experience, actual perceptions and expectation about the future” (Noya, 2007, 28). They refer to the whole economic, political, social or cultural aspects, and also to the people of the country. Those who have studied the concept of image tell us about the difference of “thinking with images” and “thinking with concepts”; the former entails an imaginative process –in which we manage concrete information- and the latter, a discursive process –in which we manage abstract information (Noya, 2007). This distinction is worth considering because, for cases such as Taiwan fight for its international recognition in Latin America, it is more convenient to project an image rather than disseminate information. The reason is that whereas the discursive process is abstract, analytical and static, the imaginative process is concrete and dynamic; in other words, “in the images we normally elaborate ideas or feelings through more concrete and multi-sensorial information, that is, originating from the sight and any other senses (tact, sense of smell, etc)” (Noya, 2007, 29).

Accordingly to Noya, images of states can split into different elements: stereotypes or prejudice towards their people, confidence or reliability between peoples or governments, prestige of their culture, or institutional reputation, each of them entails challenges but also advantages for Taiwan’s foreign policy strategy of public diplomacy. First, in the relation to stereotypes or prejudice –defined as oversimplified, rigid and generalized beliefs about groups of people accordingly to which all members of the group are considered to have the same set of dominant characteristics (Noya, 2007)-, Taiwan must deal mostly with the prejudices Latin American people have in respect of Chinese people in a negative sense, most of them are result only of ignorance. The main problem is that Latin American people cannot distinguish between a Taiwanese person and a Chinese person (from mainland China), for Latin Americans all of the people with Chinese appearance are Chinese and all of them are the same, just Chinese. This means that every single negative aspect of mainland China’s society can be automatically and unintentionally associated to Taiwanese society: political, economic and social aspects. As a result, Taiwan has to deal mainly with the association Latin American people make concerning the so criticized and questioned political system and the human rights violation of mainland China.

From a certain point of view, this problem is a bit similar to what United States faces at present concerning the war against international terrorism, characterized by the rise of a terrorist group –Al-Qaeda- conformed by a global net using internet to coordinate and organize its followers. In this case, as the one analyzed here, the problems are the cultural misunderstandings, whose solution is to foster strong relationships based on trust, which makes that a country improves the image about the other or has a favorable image about it.

Here we have the second element of the image of a country, the confidence. Accordingly Noya (2007) says, confidence among nations relies on essential, physical or cultural ties, social learning and economic development; for our analysis we will consider the first two. The essential, physical or cultural ties refers to features that are predetermined and immutable in the time, such as race, religion, language and geographical proximity (Noya, 2007), which in the case of Taiwan and Latin America are very different and almost insurmountable. Perhaps the language –the variable most influential to increase confidence- will be in the very long term a difference attainable to some degree, thanks to “Chinese society’s” (I mean Taiwan and mainland China) efforts to make Latin America people to learn its language. The second factor, the social learning, refers to the historical experience in the interaction among nations. At macro level, for example, the hostilities and alliances among nations make smaller nations to be more reliable due to the reduced warlike power, and at micro level, channels of communication among people of different countries are fundamental for increasing confidence and predictability (Noya, 2007).

The third component of a country’s image is the cultural prestige, a basic element of soft power too, which refers to the result of a social organization of production of ideas; this element also has the language as a fundamental tool and the demand to learn it (Noya, 2007). The increasing importance of Chinese language in Latin America shows a kind of prestige this language is attaining nowadays, due to the spectacular expansion of trade and commercial exchanges between mainland China, Taiwan and Latin America. As Noya (2007) describes it, cultural diplomacy is, therefore, a key axis because it helps to cement relationships above solid basis of confidence, it creates stable relationships with other peoples, it gets to influential citizens belonging to other societies, it identifies opportunities of cooperation, it has access to young people, it helps to civil society’s development and it counterbalances the hate and incomprehension.

The fourth and last component of a country’s image is the institutional reputation, which is tightly related to the cultural prestige, and the desire to obtain recognition and moral credibility in the international community (Noya, 2007). With respect to this variable, Taiwan is in a favorable situation because -unlike mainland China- it counts on a democratic and multi-party political system, cemented on the rule of law and on the respect of human rights.

Accordingly to the above exposition, what public diplomacy aims at is the projection of an image, overcoming stereotypes or prejudice, obtaining cultural prestige, inspiring confidence, and developing institutional reputation with the final purpose of building relationships, following three steps in the short, medium and long term. These steps represent actions done at macro level pointing at disseminating information and propaganda through the media, which is the main objective of traditional public diplomacy. Therefore, in the short term, public diplomacy is focused on managing news by reacting to events to reaffirm strategic objectives; at the medium term, a strategic communication is deployed to shape the agenda of news through activities and events to reinforce messages and influence people’s perceptions; and, in the long term, it looks for building long-lasting

relationships with the civil society of other countries so as they can recognize our values and learn from them (Noya, 2007).

Without underestimating the advantages of disseminating information and propaganda of the traditional public diplomacy, the case of Taiwan requires a deep strategy, focused on the building of relationships, but through the creation of social networks and relationships between people and civil organizations in the very long term, that is, the creation of social capital. By social capital, I understand the ability of cooperation or association of human groups, as well as the set of norms, networks, values and organizations through which actors and social groups influence and accede to the power and its resources, formulate and take decisions (Zumbado, 1998). This is the main objective of new public diplomacy approach, a sort of proactive public diplomacy, which goes beyond the promotion of communication and confidence among actors.

After considering the obstacles Taiwan faces to get the recognition of international community and the support of political allies in Latin America, public diplomacy, in its traditional and new approaches, is one of the most suitable methods. As Noya (2007) states, new public diplomacy “consists of interconnect networks that were unconnected until now on the basis of shared values” (p. 124), so diplomats will have to become “entrepreneurs of public diplomacy” that can manage the social capital of informal networks knitted by NGOs, universities, etc, facilitating contacts and dialogue among them. As a consequence, this strategy allows Taiwan to penetrate in Latin American societies bellow the formal channels of communication with governments and try to influence from the bottom up. Therefore, it is a dissimulated manner of projecting an image, erasing the prejudices, gaining confidence of Latin American people, increasing its cultural prestige and improving its international reputation, and, by means of this, to be able of influencing political authorities from bellow.

4.2 How new public diplomacy approach can be applied to Chile by Taiwan: Key Chilean spheres and actors on which Taiwan could focus its influence

As the rest of Beijing’s political allies in Latin America, Chile cannot establish diplomatic relations with Taipei; this also means that authorities from both sides –Chile and Taiwan– cannot hold regular official meetings, which prevents from any deepening of bilateral relations with Taipei. But the case of Chile is special among the rest of Latin American countries, with the exception of Peru^{††}, because Chile has a Free Trade Agreement with mainland China since 2006 when it was put into effect. Since then bilateral relations have been tightened and commercial exchanges have increased outstandingly. Chilean exports to China has grown from 5 billion of U.S. dollars in 2006 to 10 billion of U.S. dollars in 2008, while Chinese imports have also augmented from 3 billion of U.S. dollars in 2006 to 6 billion of U.S. dollars, which represents a total commercial exchange of 16 billion of dollars in 2008 and a positive balance of trade for Chile (Dirección General de Relaciones Económicas Internacionales del Gobierno de Chile). Therefore, Chile must maintain good relations with China so as to foster its trade exchange.

For Chile, it is also strongly convenient to have good relations with Beijing, due to the increasing weight of China in the international system not only in the economic field but also in the political one. China is encouraging an array of new alliances with other developing countries or emerging middle powers, impelling the reconfiguration of a

^{††} Peru and mainland China signed a Free Trade Agreement recently in 2008.

multipolar international political system and boosting trade among its partners. Currently, we are in direction of the empowerment of developing countries and emerging middle powers belonging to the Southern hemisphere under the leadership of Beijing. Like many other developing and under-developed nations, Chile is paying attention to this process in which it has to participate at least in the long term, hence relationships with Beijing are crucial. Without going any further, Chilean people consider that relations with China are very important: accordingly to a survey realized in 2009, the 62% gives preference to relations with China and the 53% considers to be positive the fact that China grows so much as United States (Instituto de Estudios Internacionales Universidad de Chile and Instituto de Ciencia Política Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, 2008).

Nevertheless, the 21% of respondents thinks that China inspires less confidence, after United States (38%) and Russia (26%), and the most important fact of the survey is that the 61% considers the relations Chile has with China as trade partners rather than friends (Instituto de Estudios Internacionales Universidad de Chile and Instituto de Ciencia Política Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, 2008), which reflects that Beijing has focused its ties with other countries in the economic and commercial arena. Therefore, one area that Taiwan can strengthen is social and cultural ties by creating social capital and thus to attain a greater rapprochement with Chile.

As we have stated above, new public diplomacy is an approach of networks, in micro sense, of social or relational capital, such as associations or permanent guidelines of social interaction, with the purpose of foster communication and trust among actors. Hence the cultural diplomacy is one of the pillars of this new approach; new public diplomacy tries to understand other countries' needs, cultures, values and people, communicate our point of view and seek topics where to find common points through the dialogue (Noya, 2007).

In the culture field is where Taiwan can find some of the main difficulties to implement this strategy in Chile, as any other Latin American country, given the cultural and social differences between both people. First of all, the geographical distance is insurmountable; second, both people speak so different languages with reduced possibilities for both people to learn the language of each other, either Spanish or Chinese; third, both practice so different religions: most of Chilean people are Catholic whereas Taiwanese people practice Buddhism, Taoism, among others. Besides, both people have different habits and ways to conceive the world and neighbors.

In order to build confidence overcoming the cultural barriers, scholars of new public diplomacy establish three principles: (a) mutuality, reciprocity, double-directionality of the communication; (b) intensive contact with collective groups non-formal and non-governmental; (c) to be self-critical instead of hiding power relations; and (d) not to build trust on the basis of words or discourse, but on the practice, cooperating in projects and concrete actions (Noya, 2007). This strategy considers that a fundamental objective of the state is the development of networks and associations to work day by day, since only on the basis of a daily work is possible to get the trust of people; that is why this diplomacy is also called the diplomacy of daily life, more focused on the "micro", on informal relations and groups, than on the "macro", on major institutions and mass media; in other words, new public diplomacy is a diplomacy "from people to people", or the civil diplomacy (through NGOs) or diaspora diplomacy (Noya, 2007).

As a consequence, non-state actors are the protagonists, because they can contribute to the promotion of country's soft power, that is, the power of attraction and seduction; non-state

actors are able to disseminate the attractiveness of a country's culture, values, political ideas, etc. The state has to establish network relationships with domestic non-state actors so that it can harness the image and value resources of non-state actors and thus enhance its ability to capture the mind space of foreign audience (Bátora, 2005). Bátora explains in details this process as follows:

“This involves efforts by the state at forging meaning connections with soft-power assets associated with non-state structures (ideational or territorial) at home and abroad. Value- and image assets that constitute the basis of the attractiveness of a state are embedded within societal actors of the respective state. What foreign ministries (who represent the official face of a state abroad) try to do, is to harness the potential of the positive images and values associated with domestic non-state actors. Clearly, directive steering is not possible in a democratic society and non-state actors often choose not to let themselves be associated with any state, be it the one where they are located or another one. In such a situation, governments (and notably foreign ministries) are trying to find issue areas of common concern, shared values and common images that would enable cooperation and mutual support between governmental activities and activities of societal actors, which would provide mutual benefits in terms of soft power” (Bátora, 2005, 3).

Therefore, to implement this strategy, grounded on shared value and image platforms, the state must rest on sectors such as NGOs, universities, emigrants, political parties and private enterprises. These actors are more suitable than governmental authorities and diplomats, because the formers inspire more trust, posse moral authority that governments do not have, and, the most important, they are independent from any political interest (Noya, 2007). Diaspora is another group state can work with, either those in the country or those in the foreign country; both can offer an immediate vision of people's problems and needs that studies and survey cannot show (Noya 2007). Political parties as associations can promote the political dialogue among countries, creating channels of communication bellow the formal diplomacy that could influence positively on it (Noya, 2007). And, finally, private enterprises are also included in public diplomacy strategy, because many of them have achieved to produce strong identifications with their products, mainly among young people, through their trademarks (Noya, 2007).

As a consequence, public diplomacy strategy splits the state's task of capture the mind of foreign audience into two parts. The fist one goes from the government to its domestic non-state actors -which can be NGOs, emigrants, political parties and private enterprises- (*public diplomacy*), and the second one goes from the domestic non-state actors to the foreign non-state actors (or “people to people diplomacy”). According to this, for the improvement of the rapprochement between Taiwan and Chile, it is considered here that it is necessary that Taiwanese and Chilean civil societies have opportunities to get closer. Among Chilean non-state actors, here it is proposed that Taiwan should focus on Chilean NGOs, since they are very respected by Chilean public opinion, they work directly with people so citizens value very much their support and most of them are politically independent. That is why, a set of Chilean NGOs with which Taiwanese NGOs could establish relationships of cooperation and information exchange is showed as fallows (you can find a whole list of Chilean NGOs and their web sites in the appendix).

Figure 7: Themes addressed by Taiwanese NGOs and Chilean ONGs

Area	Chilean ONGs	Taiwanese NGOs
<p>Human rights – Children and young people</p>	<p>Human rights (general): Center of mental health and human rights (CINTRAS) Commission for juvenile rights (CODEJU) Corporation for the promotion and defense of peoples’ rights (CODEPU) Chilean commission of human rights Committee of Chilean service Corporation of political returnees Corporation of fathers for the equity in front of their children “Fathers forever” Movement for life Foundation of social assistance to Christian Churches (FASIC) Latin American institute of mental health and human rights (ILAS) Service for Peace and Justice (SERPAJ Chile) Center for defense of children abuse (CEDENIM) Corporation of opportunity and action (OPCIÓN) Corporation of citizens freedoms Foundation “Paternitas” Unified movement of sexual minorities (MUMS) Victims of delinquency</p>	<p>Human Rights Education Foundation Chinese Association for Human Rights Taiwan Foundation for democracy Peacetime foundation Taiwan World League for Freedom and Democracy Democratic Pacific Union Judicial Reform Foundation Amnesty International Taiwan Chan Fo-Chuan Center for the Study of Human Rights</p>

Young people's rights:

Chilean Association for United Nations (ACHNU)
ARASI NGO
Corporation - Program "Caleta Sur"
Cultural and sportive center for youth "Cordillera"
Juvenil center "Carlos Gatica"
Foundaton Center of education and promotion of solidary action (CEPAS)
Foundation of assistance to disabled (COANIL)
Corporation of assistance to the burnt child (COANIQUEM)
Council of defense of the child home "Los Laureles Codeni"
Corporation for pediatric nutrition (CONIN)
Corporation "Create"
Center of re-education of addicted people (DAR)
International defense of children (DNI)
Foundation Support for the unprotected childhood (ANIDE)
Foundation Institute of colonies and campings of houses for children
Foundation "Tierra Esperanza"
Corporation Program of communitarian services "La Caleta"
Foundation for the protection of the childhood hurt by the emergency states (PIDEE)
Chilean Corporation for Children and Young people's rights (PRODENI)
Service for young people's development (SEDEJ)
Protector society of the childhood
Society for the assistance of the impaired child
Chilean foundation for adoption
Center for promotion and support to the childhood (PAICABI)

Good Shepherd Sisters Taiwan
Dwen An Social Welfare Foundation
Child Welfare League Foundation
Glory Foundation
Tzih Hual Social Welfare Foundation
Jung Chuan Child Safety Foundation

<p>Gender</p>	<p>Center of training for women “Anaclara” Center of technical training of the woman (CATEMU) Center of studies and attention of the child and woman (CEANIM) Center of studies for the development of woman (CEDEM) House of meeting of the woman (CEDEMU) Center of studies of the woman (CEM) Center of development of woman (DOMOS) Institute of the woman ISIS International Service of communication of women Corporation “La Morada” Movement for the emancipation of the Chilean woman (MEMCH) Program of action with women (Prosam) Network on health of Latin American and Caribbean women (RSMLAC)</p>	<p>Collective of Sex Workers and Supporters Women’s Federation of World Peace, Taiwan R.O.C. Taipei Association for the Promotion of Women’s Rights Taipei Women’s Rescue Foundation Taiwan Women’s Link End Child Prostitution in Asian Tourism (ECPAT) Taiwan Awakening foundation National Alliance of Taiwan Women Association Taiwan Gender Equity Education Association Taiwan Women’s Development Association TransAsia Sisters Association Modern Women’s Foundation Foundation for Women rights Promotion and Development The Garden of Hope Foundation</p>
<p>Education and culture</p>	<p>Corporation of community education “Santo Niño Jesús” Center for the research of education development (CIDE) Corporation Center of Education and Technology Educational corporation and juvenile promotion “Juan Diego de Guadalupe” Educative corporation Juan XXIII” Interdisciplinary program in research and education Foundation for popular development and culture (DECUP) Education and communications (ECO) Education for the improvement of life quality (EDUK) Corporation of education and popular development “El Trampolín”</p>	<p>Humanistic Education Foundation Champions Education Association, R.O.C. The YWCA of Taiwan Public Television Service Foundation Taiwan Mediawatch Foundation Bunun Cultural and Education Foundation National Association for the Promotion of Community Universities King Car Education Foundation The Dharma Drum Mountain Cultural & Educational Foundation Hsin Yi Foundation Hong’s Foundation for Education and Culture Lan En Cultural and Educational Foundation</p>

	<p>Center for juvenile training and development (FOLICO) Foundation school radio for rural development (FREDER) Christian foundation of social and educational action (FUNCASE) Educational and cultural foundation “SAN PABLO” Chilean institute of cooperative education (ICECOOP) Popular education institute (IEP) Institute for rural education (IER) Chilean institute of therapy of the family Institute of educational service “Chile (ISECH) Promotion and exchange of educational and Technological resources “Taller PIRET” Workshop of cultural action (TAC)</p>	<p>Y’s Men International, Taiwan Region Teacher Chang Foundation The Frontier Foundation Foundation for the Advancement of Outstanding Scholarship Chiang Chiang-Kuo Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange</p>
<p>Community development: Labor, poverty and original peoples</p>	<p>Corporation for the promotion of small enterprises (PROPESA) Foundation of social assistance of the Chilean chamber of construction (SAS) Corporation for development and promotion of production (SUR) Urban center of technical assistance “North workshop” Center of professional action “Tijeral” Fund hope solidary micro-credit Foundation “Banigualdad” Foundation “Contigo” Foundation “Transcender” Center of labor studies and consultanships (CEAL) Young people for development and production (JUNDEP) Center of labor studies Alberto Hurtado (CELAH) Center of labor training “San José Obrero” Center of professionals for</p>	<p>Community Empowerment Society, R.O.C. Peitou Culture Foundation Association of Community-Activist in Taiwan Formosa Charity Group The Youngsun Culture & Education Foundation Jenju Community Development Association Tao-Mi Eco-Village TSUEI MA MA Foundation for Housing and Community Service Hsinchu County Chiu Tsan Tou Cultural Association New Home Land Foundation Hsin-Kang Foundation of Culture and Education</p>

community action (CEPPAC)
Corporation of syndical research and consultanship (CIASI)
Corporation for labor development of Aysen (CODESA)
Chilean center of productivity in construction (CPC)
Center of regional of technical and entrepreneurial assistance (CRATE)
Unitary head office of workers of Chile (CUT)
Agrarian studies and Works (ETA)
Corporation W.W.B.-FINAM
Foundation of charity “Capacitas Chile”
Foundation of entrepreneurial formation (GE)
Solidary foundation “Work for a brother”
Institute of projects, researching and training for employment and development (INPRICED)
Corporation “AVANZACHILE”
Foundation for the neighborhood and community action (AVEC)
Corporation national coordinator of elderly (CCNAM)
National center of the family (CENFA)
Foundation for the overcoming of poverty
Foundation “PROHUMANA”
Foundation “A roof for Chile”
National network of organizations of volunteers of Chile “CHILE VOLUNTARIO”
“AUKIN MAPU” NGO
“AMUR” NGO
Urban indigenous society “PACHA ARU”
Mapuche council of Cerro Navia “KIÑE KUELAIN TAIÑ”
Corporation for indigenous micro-enterprises (CORMI)
Center of documentation “RUKA DUGUN” NGO
Development for indigenous peoples “OIES”

Mapuche corporation “NEWEN”
“DZOMO TAÑI RAKIDUAM” NGO
“EPU REHUE” NGO
“FOLILAIN” NGO
“FOLILCHE” NGO
“FOYEN MAPU” NGO
“FOLILCHE AFLAIAI” NGO
Foundation indigenous institute
“HUE RAYEN MAPU” NGO
“HUILKUNCHE” NGO
Indigenous home “José Alcapan”
“INTI MARKA” NGO
“INCHIN MAPU” NGO
“INTI TATAN WANASKA” NGO
Center of communications “JUFKEN MAPU”
Kinder garden “RAKIDUAM”
“KIÑE WAYIN” NGO
“KATRURRAI” NGO
“KALLFULICAN” NGO
“KIÑE PU DOMO LAMNGIEN” NGO
“KATRIWALA” NGO
“KIÑE RAKIDUAM KUIFE KUCHE MAPU” NGO
“KO KIYEN” NGO
“KIÑE PU LIWEN” NGO
“KUNIL” NGO
“KIMEN MAPU” NGO
Mapuche center of studies and documentation “LIWEN”
“LONKO KALLFUCURA” NGO
“LELFUNCHE” NGO
Araucanian cultural league
“MULLELLCHE”

	<p>“MELI WIXAN MAPU” NGO “MELI REWE” NGO “NEHUENTUAIN” NGO “NEWENCHE” NGO “NEWEN” NGO “PEWENCHE E SANTA MARIA” NGO “PAE PAE HERE TAINA” NGO “PEGUN DUGUN” NGO “PETU MOGUELEIN MAHUIDACHE” NGO “RHUMEL MONGE MONGELEAIÑ” NGO “RAYEN WINGKUL” NGO “RAYEN MAPU” NGO “TAIÑ ADKIMÑ” NGO “TRAWUN MAPU” NGO “TREPEIÑ PU LAMNGEN” NGO Union of young indigenous students “UJEI” “WERKEN” NGO “WE LIWEN” NGO “WE FACHANTU DOMO” NGO “WE FOLILCHE AMULEAIÑ VALPO” NGO “WEICHAFE” NGO “XAWUN RUCA” NGO Observatory of indigenous peoples’ rights</p>	
<p>Environmental protection</p>	<p>Corporation “ Bosqueduca” Foundation “House of the peace” Center for rescue and re-habilitation “Primates XXI century ” Corporation for the conservation and preservation of environment “CHILE Environment” Corporation of researching in alternative agriculture (CIAL) Industrial corporation for regional development of Bio Bio (CIDERE)</p>	<p>Taiwan Cetacean Society Wild Bird Society of Taipei Green Citizens’ Action Alliance Butterfly Conservation Society of Taiwan Taiwan Environmental Action Network Taiwan Environmental Protection Union Taiwan Environmental Information Association Blue Tungkang Creek Eco Conservation Association</p>

<p>Center of training, education and development for the environment (CIEDAM) Center of research and planning about the environment (CIPMA) National Committee for the defense of fauna and flora (CODEFF) Environmental Committee “Conscience 21” Ecologic Council of Los Angeles Agrarian corporation for development Environmental corporation of the South Corporation Center for sustainable development “El Peral” Corporation of development “VERTIENTES” Corporation “El Canelo de Nos” Rural development of “Colchagua” Defenders of Chilean forests Foundation rural life “Dolores Valdés de Covarrubias” Group of action for the Bio Bio (GABB) Center of ecologic diffusion (GAIA) Group of agrarian researching (GIA) Institute of political ecology (IEP) Movement Friends, defense and ecologic safeguard “Mather” Latin American observatory of environmental conflicts Ecology and Development Association of engineering in forestry for the native forest Center of cetacean conservation CCC-CHILE Center of agrarian and environmental studies (CEA) Independent center in resources and research for sustainable development (RIDES) Council for the defense of the Patagonia</p>	<p>Wetlands Taiwan Wild at Heart Legal Defense Association Homemakers’ Union and Foundation Taiwan Watch Institute Meinung People’s Association The Society of Wilderness Jane Goodall Institute Taiwan Black-faced Spoonbill Conservation Society</p>
---	--

	<p>Ecosystems Foundation “Biodiversa” Foundation “Let’s defend the city” Foundation “Origin” Foundation for the promotion of sustainable development (TERRAM) Foundation “Darwin’s path Chile” Program sustainable Chile Society Friends of trees</p>	
<p>Health</p>	<p>Association of the blind of Chile Association of diabetic Association of deaf persons of Chile Association of dialyzed and transplanted of Chile (ASODI) Chilean Association of fathers and friends of autistic (ASPAUT) National corporation of cancer (CONAC) Corporation of visually impaired persons’ friends Chilean corporation for preventing AIDS “ACCIONGAY” Corporation of the transplant Corporation of re-habilitation Dr. Carlos Bresky Corporation of health and social policies (CORSAPS) “Forja Mundos” NGO Popular education on health (EPES) Foundation “Vida” Chilean league against the epilepsy “VIVO POSITIVO” NGO “APROFA” NGO</p>	<p>Premature Baby Foundation Hospice Foundation of Taiwan Taiwan Breast Cancer’s Alliance Childhood Burn Foundation of the R.O.C Federation of the Spinal Cord Injured The Alliance for the Mentally Ill of the R.O.C., Taiwan Foundation for Children with Development Delay Taiwan Medical Association The National Union of Nurses Association, R.O.C. Cardiac Children’s Foundation of the R.O.C Taiwan Health Reform Foundation Taiwan Nurses Association Taiwan Foundation for Rare Disorders Catholic Sanipax Socio-Medical Service & Education Foundation Mental Health Foundation Autism Society Taiwan, R.O.C. Down Syndrome Foundation of R.O.C Parents Association for Persons with Intellectual Disabilities, Taiwan The League of Welfare Organizations for the Disabled, R.O.C.</p>

		<p>Technology Development Association of the Disabled in Taiwan The Syin-Lu Social Welfare Foundation The First Social Welfare Foundation Children Are Us Foundation Sunshine Social Welfare Foundation Children's Hearing Foundation Cultural & Educational Foundation for the Blind Federation for the Welfare of the Eldery The Catholic Foundation of Alzheimer's Disease and Related Dementia Hondao Elderly Welfare Foundation</p>
--	--	--

Source: Own elaboration from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China (2006), Portal de las Organizaciones No Gubernamentales de Chile and Silber Editores (2009).

This figure shows the common concerns between Taiwanese NGOs and Chilean NGOs. As we can see, in Chile there are a plenty of non-governmental organizations devoted to very sensitive themes Chileans have to face at present, such as human rights, women's rights, education, health, community development, poverty, child's rights protection, environmental protection, labor and original peoples. These represent the main social problems of Chilean society and include some of the chief needs of Chilean unprotected groups of people. Likewise, the activities of Chilean NGOs generally are focused on the topics and social groups that Chilean state cannot help or its assistance is not enough to satisfy the huge needs these groups have. Among these social problems it is worth mentioning: women rights that are un-respected because of cultural values and principles driven by machismo; bad quality of public education; bad quality of public health service; poverty and indigence, unprotected child's rights; unprotected original peoples' rights and "mapuche" ethnos; and natural resources protection from pollution, protection of animals on its way to extinction and reforestation. For these reasons, for Taiwanese government to attain a closer relation with Chilean civil society is necessary that its several and developed NGOs establish contacts and ties with Chilean NGOs according to the topic and social group they point at, by means of promoting Taiwan's soft power and thus making it more attractive to Chilean society.

Finally, by means of a soft power strategy based on becoming an attractive society and culture, Taiwan can achieve that Chilean people to recognize its culture and the existence of several common concerns, values and principles, and be able to change its prejudice and stereotypes about Chinese society. The last objective of this strategy is that Chilean government, and naturally other Latin American nations as well, notices the need to count on formal structures or institutions to have a closer relation with Taipei so as to improve people-to-people ties through Chilean and Taiwanese civil societies.

CONCLUSIONS REMARKS

As it was sustained in this paper, Taiwan faces many obstacles to have normal and formal relationships with the rest of the world due to the pressure wielded by mainland China for decades. Taiwan has had to face Chinese war games, the probability of a war across the Strait and the continuous political pressure through official statements and speeches by behalf of Beijing's authorities. The pressure of the PRC on Taipei is also exercised by means of conforming international coalitions with Latin American nations in alliances such as the G-20 of developing countries and BRIC countries, where China has reinforced its ties with Latin American governments. Something similar happens with extra-regional actors, such as India and Iran, who have tightened its relations with Latin America during the last decade, and with which Beijing has formal diplomatic relations and maintained a high political tuning because they share the same interests in the international system.

Given the wide obstacles Taiwan faces to obtain the recognition as a sovereign state by the international community and Latin American nations, it was established in this paper that one of the most suitable methods derived from the International Relations discipline for small and medium-sized states to extend their recognition and increase their international visibility is public diplomacy. For the specific case of Taiwan this mechanism turns out to be crucial since this strategy allows Taiwan to penetrate in Latin American societies bellow the formal channels of communication with foreign governments and try to influence from the bottom up. It is a dissimulated manner of projecting an image, erasing the prejudices, gaining confidence of Latin American people, increasing its cultural prestige and improving

its international reputation, and, by means of this, to be able of influencing political authorities from below.

This method can be applied both for the case of Latin American countries and of Chile. This strategy, specifically, new public diplomacy lies on the active participation of civil society through domestic NGOs, who work on the basis of their soft power so as to create social capital and social networks along with foreign NGOs. In the case of Chile, such an approach is decisive due to the fact that Chile has a FTA with China, which compels even more Chilean government to maintain cordial relationships with Beijing. The analysis of Chilean NGOs' fields of work shows that there is an array of areas of common concern – like human rights, community development, poverty, gender issues, labor, original people's issues, education and culture, environmental protection and health-, in which Chilean NGOs need assistance and technical cooperation. These issues represent an important niche where Taiwanese NGOs can work and Taiwan government must take into consideration to encourage its domestic NGOs to work.

REFERENCES

Bátora, J. (2005, February 11-13). Multistakeholder Public Diplomacy of Small and Medium-Sized States: Norway and Canada Compared. *Paper presented to the International Conference on Multistakeholder Diplomacy, Mediterranean Diplomatic Academy*.

Bell, D. (2008). *China's New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life in Changing Society*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Bermúdez, Á. (2008). El enemigo de mi enemigo: la alianza Irán-América Latina. *Documento CIDOB* (21), 77-119.

Cardozo, G. (2008, February 27). *La disputa China-Taiwán en América Central y el Caribe*. Retrieved April 10, 2009, from <http://www.igadi.org/index.html>.

Cesarin, S. (2007). La seducción combinada: China e India en América Latina y el Caribe. *Working Paper of Centro Argentino de Estudios Internacionales* (29).

Department of Defense of the United States of America. (2008). *Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2008*. Retrieved March 23, 2010, from http://hongkong.usconsulate.gov/uploads/images/pAw-Xhv1qHB7cBNrkQbc3A/uscn_others_2008030301.pdf.

Dirección General de Relaciones Económicas Internacionales del Gobierno de Chile. (n.d.). *Tratado de Libre Comercio Chile-China*. Retrieved April 15, 2010, from <http://rc.direcon.cl/acuerdo/1457>.

G-20 of developing countries. (n.d.). Retrieved from <http://www.g-20.mre.gov.br>.

Hu, W. (1997). China's Taiwan policy and East Asian security. *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 27 (3), 374-391.

Instituto de Estudios Internacionales Universidad de Chile and Instituto de Ciencia Política Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. (2008). *Chile, las Américas y el Mundo: Opinión Pública y Política Exterior*. Santiago, Chile: RIL.

Leonard, M., Stead, C., & Smewing, C. (2002). *Public Diplomacy*. London: The Foreign Policy Centre.

Mendelson Forman, J., & Moreira, S. (2008). Taiwan-China Balancing Act in Latin America. *ARI Instituto Real Elcano* (154).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People's Republic of China. (2008). *China's Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean*. Retrieved July 10, 2009, from <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t521025.htm>

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China. (2009). *Partnerships for Progress and Sustainable Development: White Paper on Foreign Aid Policy*. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China, Taipei.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China. (2008). *Foreign Policy Report, 7th*

Public diplomacy as a method to improve the insertion of Taiwan in Latin America and attain a greater rapprochement to Chile

Congress of the Legislative Yuan, 2nd Session (September 25). Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China, Taipei.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China. (2006). *Taiwan NGOs: Reaching out the world – Caring in Action*. Retrieved April 2010, from NGO Affairs Committee: <http://www.taiwannngo.tw/english/default.asp>

Molina Rabadán, D., & Igelsias Onofrio, M. (2006). Noopolitik, Diplomacia Pública y Soft Power en la Sociedad Informacional. *Working Paper of Centro Argentino de Estudios Internacionales* (2).

Narlikar, A. (2003). *International Trade and Developing Countries – Bargaining Coalitions in the GATT & WTO*. Routledge.

Noya, J. (2007). *Diplomacia Pública para el Siglo XXI: La Gestión de la Imagen Exterior y la Opinión Pública Internacional*. Barcelona: Ariel S.A.

Nye, J. (2002-2003). Limits of American Power. *Political Science Quarterly* , 117 (4), 545-559.

Nye, J. (2004). *Soft Power. The Means to Success in World Politics*. New York: Public Affairs.

Oxford Analytica. (2009). *Analytica Daily Brief Service*. Retrieved from <http://www.oxan.com>.

Pérez, F. (2004). Taiwán y América Latina: Estrategia de Aproximación y Situación Actual . *UNISCI Discussion Papers* (4), 1-22.

Portal de las Organizaciones No Gubernamentales de Chile. (n.d.). Retrieved April 2010, from www.ong.cl

Ríos, X. (2006, November). China y América Latina: ¿una relación problemática? *FRIDE Comentario* , 1-5.

Rodríguez, M. E. (2008). La batalla diplomática de Beijing y Taipei en América Latina y el Caribe. *Revista CIDOB d'Afers Internacionals* (81), 209-231.

Romberg, A. (2008). Cross-Strait Relations: In Search of Peace. *China Leadership Monitor* (23).

Shinxue, J. (2008). The Chinese Foreign policy perspective. In G. Paz, & R. Roett (Eds.), *China's Expansion into Western Hemisphere: Implications for Latin America and the United States*. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Silber Editores. (2009). *Guía Silber: Directorio de Instituciones de Chile Libro Agenda Semestral*. Santiago, Chile: Silber Editores.

The Goldman Sachs Global Economics Department. (2007). *BRICs and Beyond November*. The Goldman Sachs.

The People's Republic of China. (2005). *Anti-Secession Law*. Retrieved March 29, 2010, from http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200503/14/eng20050314_176746.html.

The Peoples' Republic of China. (1982). *Constitution of the People's Republic of China*. Retrieved March 29, 2010, from <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html>.

The People's Republic of China. (1995). *Jiang Zemin's Eight-point Proposal*. Retrieved March 27, 2010, from http://www.gwytb.gov.cn:8088/detail.asp?table=JiangEP&title=Jiang+Zemin's+Eight-point+Proposal&m_id=3.

Wines, M., & Wong, E. (2009, April 1). *An Unsure China Steps Onto the Global Stage*. Retrieved April 2, 2010, from <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/02/world/asia/02china.html>.

Zhao, S. (1999/2000). Military Coercion and Peaceful Offence: Beijing's Strategy of National Reunification with Taiwan. *Pacific Affairs*, 72 (4), 495-512.

Zumbado, C. (1998). Desarrollo y capital social: redescubriendo la riqueza de las naciones. *Revista Instituciones y Desarrollo* (1).

APPENDIX

Area	NGO	Web site
Human Rights	Center of mental health and human rights (CINTRAS)	http://www.cintras.org
	Commission for juvenile rights (CODEJU)	No web site
	Corporation for the promotion and defense of peoples' rights (CODEPU)	http://www.codepu.cl
	Chilean commission of human rights	No web site
	Committee of Chilean service	http://www.cosech.tie.cl
	Corporation of political returnees	http://www.retornados.cl
	Corporation of fathers for the equity in front of their children "Fathers forever"	http://www.papaspor siempre.cl
	Movement for life	http://www.anonimosporlavida.cl
	Foundation of social assistance to Christian Churches (FASIC)	http://www.fasic.org
	Latin American institute of mental health and human rights (ILAS)	http://www.ilas.cl
	Service for Peace and Justice (SERPAJ Chile)	http://www.serpajchile.cl
	Center for defense of children abuse (CEDENIM)	No web site
	Corporation of opportunity and action (OPCIÓN)	www.opcion.cl
	Corporation of citizens freedoms	www.libertadesciudadanas.cl

	Foundation "Paternitas"	http://www.paternitas.cl/
	Unified movement of sexual minorities (MUMS)	www.mums.cl
	Victims of delinquency	www.victimas.cl

Area	NGO	Web site
Education and culture	Corporation of community education "Santo Niño Jesús"	http://www.ong.cl/santoninojesus
	Center for the research of education development (CIDE)	http://www.cide.cl
	Corporation Center of Education and Technology	http://www.corporacioncet.cl
	Educational corporation and juvenile promotion "Juan Diego de Guadalupe"	No web site
	Educative corporation Juan XXIII"	No web site
	Interdisciplinary program in research and education	http://www.piie.cl
	Foundation for popular development and culture (DECUP)	
	Education and communications (ECO)	http://www.ongeco.cl
	Education for the improvement of life quality (EDUK)	http://www.eduk.cl
	Corporation of education and popular development "El Trampolín"	http://www.ong.cl/trampolin
	Center for juvenile training and development (FOLICO)	No web site

	Foundation school radio for rural development (FREDER)	No web site
	Christian foundation of social and educational action (FUNCASE)	No web site
	Educational and cultural foundation “SAN PABLO”	http://www.fespa.cl
	Chilean institute of cooperative education (ICECOOP)	http://www.icecoop.cl
	Popular education institute (IEP)	http://fundiep.cl
	Institute for rural education (IER)	http://web.ier.cl/corporativo
	Chilean institute of therapy of the family	http://www.terapiafamiliar.cl
	Institute of educational service “Chile (ISECH)	http://www.isech.cl
	Promotion and exchange of educational and Technological resources “Taller PIRET”	No web site
	Workshop of cultural action (TAC)	http://accioncultural.cl

Area	NGO	Web site
Labor	Center of labor studies and consultanships (CEAL)	http://www.ceal.ucv.cl
	Young people for development and production (JUNDEP)	http://www.jundep.cl
	Center of labor studies Alberto Hurtado (CELAH)	http://www.celah.cl
	Center of labor training “San José Obrero”	No web site

Center of professionals for community action (CEPPAC)	http://www.ceppac.cl
Corporation of syndical research and consultanship (CIASI)	http://www.ciasi.cl
Corporation for labor development of Aysen (CODESA)	No web site
Chilean center of productivity in construction (CPC)	No web site
Center of regional of technical and entrepreneurial assistance (CRATE)	http://www.crate.cl
Unitary head office of workers of Chile (CUT)	http://www.cutchile.cl
Agrarian studies and Works (ETA)	
Corporation W.W.B.-FINAM	http://www.finam.cl
Foundation of charity “Capacitas Chile”	No web site
Foundation of entrepreneurial formation (GE)	http://www.generacionempresarial.cl
Solidary foundation “Work for a brother”	http://www.tph.cl
Institute of projects, researching and training for employment and development (INPRICED)	http://www.inpriced.cl
Corporation for the promotion of small enterprises (PROPESA)	No web site
Foundation of social assistance of the Chilean chamber of construction (SAS)	No web site
Corporation for development and promotion of production (SUR)	No web site
Urban center of technical assistance “North workshop”	No web site

Public diplomacy as a method to improve the insertion of Taiwan in Latin America and attain a greater rapprochement to Chile

	Center of professional action “Tijeral”	http://www.ong.cl/tijeral
	Fund hope solidary micro-credit	www.fondoesperanza.cl
	Foundation “Banigualdad”	www.banigualdad.cl
	Foundation “Contigo”	www.fundacioncontigo.cl
	Foundation “Transcender”	www.fundaciontrascender.cl

Area	NGO	Web site
Environmental protection	Corporation “ Bosqueduca”	No web site
	Foundation “House of the peace”	http://www.casadelapaz.cl
	Center for rescue and re-habilitation “Primates XXI century ”	http://www.macacos.cl
	Corporation for the conservation and preservation of environment “CHILE Environment”	http://www.chileambiente.cl
	Corporation of researching in alternative agriculture (CIAL)	http://www.cial.cl
	Industrial corporation for regional development of Bio Bio (CIDERE)	http://www.ciderebiobio.cl
	Center of training, education and development for the environment (CIEDAM)	No web site
	Center of research and planning about the environment (CIPMA)	http://cipma.cl
	National Committee for the defense of fauna and flora (CODEFF)	http://www.codeff.cl

	Environmental Committee "Conscience 21"	No web site
	Ecologic Council of Los Angeles	No web site
	Agrarian corporation for development	No web site
	Environmental corporation of the South	http://www.ambiental.cl
	Corporation Center for sustainable development "El Peral"	No web site
	Corporation of development "VERTIENTES"	No web site
	Corporation "El Canelo de Nos"	http://www.elcanelo.cl
	Rural development of "Colchagua"	No web site
	Defenders of Chilean forests	No web site
	Foundation rural life "Dolores Valdés de Covarrubias"	http://www.fvrpuc.cl
	Group of action for the Bio Bio (GABB)	No web site
	Center of ecologic diffusion (GAIA)	No web site
	Group of agrarian researching (GIA)	http://www.gia.cl
	Institute of political ecology (IEP)	http://www.iepe.org
	Movement Friends, defense and ecologic safeguard "Mather"	No web site
	Latin American observatory of environmental conflicts	http://www.olca.cl
	Ecology and Development	http://www.ecodes.org

	Association of engineering in forestry for the native forest	www.bosquenativo.cl
	Center of cetacean conservation CCC-CHILE	www.ccc-chile.org
	Center of agrarian and environmental studies (CEA)	www.ceachile.cl
	Independent center in resources and research for sustainable development (RIDES)	www.rides.cl
	Council for the defense of the Patagonia	www.patagoniasinrepresas.cl
	Ecosystems	www.ecosistemas.cl
	Foundation “Biodiversa”	www.biodiversa.cl
	Foundation “Let’s defend the city”	www.defendamoslaciudad.cl
	Foundation “Origin”	www.fundacionorigen.cl
	Foundation for the promotion of sustainable development (TERRAM)	www.terram.cl
	Foundation “Darwin’s path Chile”	www.sendadarwin.cl
	Program sustainable Chile	www.chilesustentable.net
	Society Friends of trees	www.amigosdelarbol.cl

Area	NGO	Web site
Gender	Center of training for women “Anaclara”	No web site
	Center of technical training of the woman (CATEMU)	No web site
	Center of studies and attention of the child and woman (CEANIM)	http://www.resiliencia.cl/ceanim.htm
	Center of studies for the development of woman (CEDEM)	http://www.cedem.cl
	House of meeting of the woman (CEDEMU)	No web site
	Center of studies of the woman (CEM)	http://www.cem.cl
	Center of development of woman (DOMOS)	http://domoschile.cl
	Institute of the woman	http://www.insmujer.cl
	ISIS International Service of communication of women	http://www.isis.cl
	Corporation “La Morada”	http://www.lamorada.cl
	Movement for the emancipation of the Chilean woman (MEMCH)	http://www.memch.cl
	Programe of action with women (Prosam)	http://www.prosam.net
	Network on health of Latin American and Caribbean women (RSMLAC)	http://www.reddesalud.org

Area	NGO	Web site
Young people	Chilean Association for United Nations (ACHNU)	http://www.achnu.cl
	ARASI NGO	No web site
	Corporation - Program "Caleta Sur"	http://www.caletasur.cl
	Cultural and sportive center for youth "Cordillera"	http://www.organizados.cl/cejucord
	Juvenil center "Carlos Gatica"	No web site
	Foundaton Center of education and promotion of solidary action (CEPAS)	http://www.cepas.cl
	Foundation of assistance to disabled (COANIL)	http://www.coanil.cl
	Corporation of assistance to the burnt child (COANIQUEM)	http://www.coaniquem.cl
	Council of defense of the child home "Los Laureles Codeni"	http://www.codeni.cl
	Corporation for pediatric nutrition (CONIN)	http://www.conin.cl
	Corporation "Create"	http://create.cl
	Center of re-education of addicted people (DAR)	http://www.hogardar.co.cl
	International defense of children (DNI)	No web site
	Foundation Support for the unprotected childhood (ANIDE)	http://www.anide.cl

	Foundation Institute of colonies and campings of houses for children	http://www.icycchile.com
	Foundation “Tierra Esperanza”	http://www.tdesperanza.cl
	Corporation Program of communitarian services “La Caleta”	http://www.lacaleta.cl
	Foundation for the protection of the childhood hurt by the emergency states (PIDEE)	http://www.pidee.cl
	Chilean Corporation for Children and Young people’s rights (PRODENI)	http://www.prodeni.org
	Service for young people’s development (SEDEJ)	http://www.sedej.cl
	Protector society of the childhood	http://www.laprotectora.cl
	Society for the assistance of the impaired child	http://www.teleton.cl
	Chilean foundation for adoption	http://www.fadop.cl
	Center for promotion and support to the childhood (PAICABI)	www.paicabi.cl

Area	NGO	Web site
Original peoples	“AUKIN MAPU” NGO	No web site
	“AMUR” NGO	No web site
	Urban indigenous society “PACHA ARU”	http://www.pachaar.cl
	Mapuche council of Cerro Navia “KIÑE KUELAIN TAIÑ”	No web site

Corporation for indigenous micro-enterprises (CORMI)	No web site
Center of documentation “RUKA DUGUN” NGO	No web site
Development for indigenous peoples “OIES”	http://www.oies.cl
Mapuche corporation “NEWEN”	No web site
“DZOMO TAÑI RAKIDUAM” NGO	No web site
“EPU REHUE” NGO	No web site
“FOLILAIN” NGO	No web site
“FOLILCHE” NGO	No web site
“FOYEN MAPU” NGO	No web site
“FOLILCHE AFLAIAI” NGO	No web site
Foundation indigenous institute	http://www.institutoindigena.cl
“HUE RAYEN MAPU” NGO	No web site
“HUILKUNCHE” NGO	No web site
Indigenous home “José Alcapan”	No web site
“INTI MARKA” NGO	No web site
“INCHIN MAPU” NGO	No web site
“INTI TATAN WANASKA” NGO	No web site
Center of communications “JUFKEN MAPU”	No web site
Kinder garden “RAKIDUAM”	No web site

“KIÑE WAYIN” NGO	No web site
“KATRURRAP” NGO	No web site
“KALLFULICAN” NGO	No web site
“KIÑE PU DOMO LAMNGIEN” NGO	No web site
“KATRIWALA” NGO	No web site
“KIÑE RAKIDUAM KUIFE KUCHE MAPU” NGO	No web site
“KO KIYEN” NGO	No web site
“KIÑE PU LIWEN” NGO	No web site
“KUNIL” NGO	No web site
“KIMEN MAPU” NGO	No web site
Mapuche center of studies and documentation “LIWEN”	http://liwen_temuko.tripod.com/liwen.html
“LONKO KALLFUCURA” NGO	No web site
“LELFUNCHE” NGO	No web site
Araucanian cultural league “MULLELLCHE”	No web site
“MELI WIXAN MAPU” NGO	http://meli.mapuches.org
“MELI REWE” NGO	No web site
“NEHUENTUAIN” NGO	No web site
“NEWENCHE” NGO	No web site
“NEWEN” NGO	No web site

	“PEWENCHE E SANTA MARIA” NGO	N
	“PAE PAE HERE TAINA” NGO	N
	“PEGUN DUGUN” NGO	N
	“PETU MOGUELEIN MAHUIDACHE” NGO	N
	“RHUMEL MONGE MONGELEAIÑ” NGO	N
	“RAYEN WINGKUL” NGO	N
	“RAYEN MAPU” NGO	N
	“TAIÑ ADKIMÑ” NGO	N
	“TRAWUN MAPU” NGO	N
	“TREPEIÑ PU LAMNGEN” NGO	N
	Union of young indigenous students “UJEI”	N
	“WERKEN” NGO	N
	“WE LIWEN” NGO	N
	“WE FACHANTU DOMO” NGO	N
	“WE FOLILCHE AMULEAIÑ VALPO” NGO	N
	“WEICHAPE” NGO	N
	“XAWUN RUCA” NGO	N
	Observatory of indigenous peoples’ rights	w

Area	NGO	Web site
Health	Association of blind of Chile	http://www.acich.cl/
	Association of diabetic	http://www.adich.org
	Association of deaf persons of Chile	http://www.asoch.cl
	Association of dialyzed and transplanted of Chile (ASODI)	http://www.asodi.cl
	Chilean Association of fathers and friends of autistic (ASPAUT)	http://www.aspaut.cl
	National corporation of cancer (CONAC)	http://www.conac.cl
	Corporation of visually impaired persons' friends	http://www.corpaliv.cl
	Chilean corporation for preventing AIDS "ACCIONGAY"	http://www.acciongay.cl
	Corporation of the transplant	http://www.trasplante.cl
	Corporation of re-habilitation Dr. Carlos Bresky	http://www.bresky.cl
	Corporation of health and social policies (CORSAPS)	No web site
	"Forja Mundos" NGO	http://www.forjamundos.cl
	Popular education on health (EPES)	http://www.epes.cl
	Foundation "Vida"	http://www.fundacionvida.net

	Chilean league against the epilepsy	http://www.ligaepilepsia.cl
	“VIVO POSITIVO” NGO	www.vivopositivo.org
	“APROFA” NGO	http://www.aprofa.cl

Area	NGO	Web site
Community Development- Poverty	Corporation “AVANZACHILE”	No web site
	Foundation for the neighborhood and community action (AVEC)	No web site
	Corporation national coordinator of elderly (CCNAM)	No web site
	National center of the family (CENFA)	http://www.cenfa.cl
	Foundation for the overcoming of poverty	www.fundacionpobreza.cl
	Foundation “PROHUMANA”	www.prohumana.cl
	Foundation “A roof for Chile”	www.untechoparachile.cl
	National network of organizations of volunteers of Chile “CHILE VOLUNTARIO”	www.chilevoluntario.cl